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ABSTRACT 
Price Dispersion in the Airline Industry: 
The Effect of Industry Elasticity and Cross-Price Elasticity. (August 2006) 
Jong Ho Kim, B.A., Sogang University, Seoul, Korea; 
M.A., Sogang University, Seoul, Korea 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Steven Wiggins 
 
This dissertation analyzes the sources of price dispersion due to the price 
discrimination in the U.S. airline industry. Using the multi-stage budgeting approach 
with the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) specification, we estimate demand for air 
travel at the airline level, and empirically decompose an airline’s own price elasticity 
into cross-price elasticity vis-à-vis other airlines and an industry elasticity. Conceptually, 
cross-price elasticity measures the responsiveness of quantity demanded of airline 
service offered by an airline to a unilateral change in the firm’s own price with total 
expenditures given, whereas the industry elasticity measures the responsiveness of total 
quantity of airline travel demanded to a change in the overall price of air travel. Then, 
we investigate the determinants of price dispersion induced by discriminatory pricing 
across airline routes. Our results show that cross-price elasticity of demand for air travel, 
reflecting competitive-type discrimination, is the key factor affecting price dispersion in 
the airline industry. This result is consistent with the earlier findings of Borenstein and 
Rose (1994), but is based on a direct test of the underlying theory of Holmes (1989). 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation analyzes the sources of price dispersion induced by price 
discrimination in the U.S. airline industry. There is a considerable body of work 
addressing the sources of price dispersion. My work is founded on the theoretical work 
by Borenstein (1985) and the follow-on work by Holmes (1989). Borenstein shows that 
price discrimination could exist in a monopolistically competitive market. This 
important result suggests that traditional models, which prior to his work focused only 
on price discrimination in monopoly markets, are seriously incomplete.  
Holmes (1989) expands on Borenstein’s (1985) results by building on the 
fundamental result that price discrimination is rooted in differences among consumers in 
their reservation prices and brand preferences. Holmes contribution is to show that one 
can conceptually separate the price elasticity of demand for an individual firm into an 
industry elasticity and cross-price elasticity vis-à-vis other firms. When a firm 
unilaterally raises the price of its good, the industry elasticity measures the tendency of 
consumers not to buy the good at all, whereas the cross-price elasticity measures the 
tendency of consumers to buy from a rival firm selling imperfect (or heterogeneous) 
substitute.  
 
 
________________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of The Journal of Law, Economics,& Organization. 
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Price discrimination on the basis of consumers’ diverse industry elasticities is 
referred to “monopoly type” price discrimination by Borenstein and Rose (1994), while 
“competitive type” price discrimination is based on consumers’ diverse cross-price 
elasticities. The most important investigation testing between these types of price 
discrimination is carried out by Borenstein and Rose (1994). Using a reduced form 
model of price dispersion in the airline industry, they show that price dispersion is 
positively correlated with the level of market competitiveness. This empirical finding is 
suggestive of competitive-type price discrimination, and indirectly shows that 
heterogeneity in the tendency of consumers to switch airlines is the sole or dominant 
determinant of price dispersion in the airline industry. On the other hand, Borenstein and 
Rose’s (1994) seminal work can be viewed as incomplete because they only indirectly 
examine the relationship between price discrimination and the two components of price 
elasticity. In addition, they are unable to separate the industry elasticity and cross-price 
elasticity as the sources of price discrimination in their model.   
We test a model of price discrimination tied directly to Holmes (1989) which 
considers both industry and cross-price elasticity as sources of price discrimination. In 
particular, we attempt to directly test whether the industry or cross-price component of 
price elasticity is the primary determinant of observed price dispersion in the airline 
industry.  
Using the multi-stage budgeting approach with the almost ideal demand system 
(AIDS) specification, we first estimate demand for air travel at the airline level. More 
specifically, we divide the decision to travel into three stages: (1) the decision regarding 
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the travel budget, (2) the decision to travel by auto or plane, and (3) the choice among 
carriers. This type of multi-stage budgeting has been used by Ellision et al (1997), 
Hausman (1996), Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994) and Hausman and Leonard (2002). 
This methodology permits a theoretically and empirically crisp separation between the 
industry and cross-price elasticities of demand. We use both airline industry data (for the 
bottom stage as well) and travel survey micro data for estimation of the choice between 
modes of travel, and the choice of traveling or staying home. 
After estimating demand for air travel, we use the estimated components of price 
elasticities to investigate the determinants of price dispersion induced by price 
discrimination across airline routes. Following Borenstein and Rose (1994), we use the 
Gini coefficient of air fares to measure the degree of price dispersion. Our results show 
that cross-price elasticity of demand for air travel, reflecting competitive-type 
discrimination, is the key factor affecting price dispersion in the airline industry. This 
result is consistent with the earlier findings of Borenstein and Rose, but is based on a 
direct test of the underlying theory of Holmes. 
Chapter II describes the structure of consumers’ decision on travel in each of 
three stages and presents the empirical model and method, data used to estimate 
consumers choice among carriers conditional on total revenue of air travel at the bottom 
level. We discuss consumers’ decision at the top two levels and describe the empirical 
model, data used for the estimation of demand model for air travel unconditional on 
travel revenue in Chapter III. Chapter IV provides the estimated industry elasticities and 
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cross-price elasticities, and then, examines their roles in explaining price dispersion in 
the U.S. airline industry.  
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CHAPTER II 
DEMAND FOR AIR TRAVEL: FIRM LEVEL 
 
2.1 Introduction: A Multi-Stage Budgeting Model 
 
Figure 1. The Consumer Decision Tree Regarding Travel 
 
 
 
 
 
 Household 
To Travel To Stay Home 
Air Travel Auto Travel 
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline N … 
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The model of demand for air travel we use is a three-stage budgeting model 
based on multi-stage budgeting approach developed by Gorman (1959). We assume that 
travelers can allocate total expenditure in stages so that their choice in each stage is 
made conditional only on the expenditures allocated in the upper stage and prices of 
goods in that stage. The decision tree in Figure 1 illustrates the structure of travelers’ 
choice: (1) at the top stage, travelers decide whether or not to travel and expenditure is 
allocated to overall travel; (2) at the middle stage, given total travel expenditure, 
travelers determine modes of transportation; and (3) at the bottom stage, travelers’ 
preference on airlines is revealed conditional on total expenditure on air travel. 
The multi-stage budgeting model allows us to empirically decompose an airline’s 
own or firm level price elasticity into cross-price elasticity vis-à-vis other airlines and an 
industry elasticity. Conceptually, cross-price elasticity measures the responsiveness of 
quantity demanded of a good to a unilateral change in the firm’s own price with total 
expenditures given, whereas the industry elasticity measures the responsiveness of total 
quantity of airline travel demanded to a change in the overall price of air travel. Price 
elasticity measured at the bottom level in Figure 1 represents the cross-price elasticity, 
whereas at the top two levels, we observe the industry price elasticity of air travel. In this 
chapter, the focus is on measuring the cross-price elasticity among airlines at the bottom 
level of Figure 1.   
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2.2 Specification of the Almost Ideal Demand System Model 
As a demand system at the bottom stage, we employ the Almost Ideal Demand 
System (AIDS) of Deaton and Meullbauer (1980a). The AIDS specification provides a 
flexible functional form that allows for an unconstrained substitution pattern across 
products within a group. Further, without requiring homothetic preferences, the AIDS 
model aggregates perfectly over individuals, which permits aggregation of individual 
level data over various dimensions. 
Let the AIDS expenditure function for air travel on a route where N airlines are 
competing be defined as 
 )()(),(log pbupapue ⋅+=        (1) 
where u is the utility travelers derive from air travel and p is the air fare. This 
expenditure function represents the PIGLOG1 class, which allows exact aggregation over 
travelers such that demand for an airline can be represented as an outcome of decisions 
made by a rational representative traveler. We then take the following functional forms 
for )( pa and )( pb : 
  
= = =
++=
N
k
N
k
k
l
lkklkk ppppa
1 1 1
*
0 loglog2
1log)( γαα     (2) 
 
k
kppb
ββ Π= 0)(         (3) 
where ip is quantity-weighted average fare charged by airline i , and *,, γβα are 
parameters to be estimated.  Substituting (2) and (3) into (1) and applying Shepard’s 
Lemma yield the expenditure share equation of AIDS model: 
                                                 
1
 The PIGLOG represents price independent generalized logarithmic preferences 
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If equation (5) is used for the price index, the expenditure share equation is not 
linear in iplog . To avoid non-linearity in our estimation equation, we use the Stone price 
index ( 
=
⋅=
N
i ii
psP
1
loglog ) as an approximation of the price index in equation (5). In 
order to satisfy the restrictions implied by the theory of utility maximization problem of 
a representative consumer, we impose the following adding-up, homogeneity, and 
symmetry restrictions:  
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The adding-up condition ensures 1
1
=
=
N
i i
s  and is imposed by not estimating one firm’s 
share equation to avoid the problem of singularity in the error covariance matrix. In this 
setup, Southwest Airlines is the omitted share equation. In addition, Southwest’s price is 
used as the numeraire price to satisfy the homogeneity restriction.  
Under the AIDS specification, it is relative prices between alternative airlines 
and total expenditure on air travel that travelers take into account in choosing airlines. 
Previous studies on the airline industry show, however, that travelers’ demand for air 
travel depends on the quality of service and brand preference as well as relative prices 
among rival carriers.2 Accordingly, we include in our estimation equation, airline 
dummies to control for travelers’ preferences for brand, and an indirect service dummy 
to control for the quality of services offered by airlines on a particular route.3 Indirect 
service dummies represent whether an airline only offers indirect service. Table 1 
indicates that the percentage of indirect-only routes increases with statutory route 
distance. Also, the distribution of indirect-only routes varies across airlines. Meanwhile, 
when airlines offering similar mean fares are compared, the percentage of indirect-only 
service routes and the mean of revenue share incline to be negatively correlated.   
 
 
                                                 
2
 Refer to Berry, Carnall and Spiller (1996), Borenstein (1989) and Reiss and Spiller (1989). 
3
 Berry, Carnall and Spiller (1996), Borenstein (1989) and Reiss and Spiller (1989) suggest that the 
presence of hub airport should be considered in estimating the demand for air travel. Theses studies 
examine factors affecting fares charged on travelers and demand for airline service at “industry level,” 
while in this study, we estimate “carrier level” demand for air travel on those routes where Southwest 
entered. Due to our scope of study, the presence of hub airport seems to be highly correlated with a 
indirect service dummy and a brand dummy. Hence, we exclude a hub dummy in estimating firm level 
demand for air travel. 
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Table 1. Percentage of Indirect-Only Routes, Mean Fare, and Mean Revenue Share 
 
Statutory Distance Between Origin and Destination City 
1-749 miles 750-1499 miles 1500- miles 
  
Mean 
Indirect  
-Only 
Mean 
Fare 
Mean 
Share Obs 
Mean 
Indirect  
-Only 
Mean 
Fare 
Mean 
Share Obs 
Mean 
Indirect  
-Only 
Mean 
Fare 
Mean 
Share Obs 
American Airlines (AA) 47.9% 102.0  14.6% 572 73.6% 167.7  19.8% 716 75.3% 222.7  25.7% 389 
Alaskan Airlines (AS) 21.8% 99.5  17.9% 124 15.8% 141.5  38.8% 76 19.2% 335.5  0.7% 52 
Continental Airlines (CO) 24.7% 99.7  10.2% 446 50.6% 144.6  13.0% 722 40.3% 181.7  12.3% 365 
Delta Air Lines (DL) 49.3% 118.6  16.1% 594 57.7% 165.0  18.5% 711 53.4% 221.8  23.2% 388 
America West Airlines (HP) 25.0% 96.2  21.8% 252 38.0% 136.1  23.8% 387 42.2% 208.3  10.3% 258 
Northwest Airlines (NW) 58.3% 115.0  9.3% 314 59.9% 133.4  7.5% 459 73.5% 189.2  10.7% 343 
Reno Air (QQ) 9.9% 102.4  26.8% 101 15.7% 124.1  11.1% 83 9.5% 213.7  5.3% 42 
Trans World Airlines (TW) 39.5% 107.0  19.6% 306 61.0% 140.4  10.8% 469 66.0% 192.6  10.8% 324 
United Air Lines (UA) 45.7% 103.5  10.3% 411 61.1% 161.8  13.0% 627 74.3% 223.7  17.9% 381 
US Airways (US) 25.9% 118.7  14.3% 321 31.8% 148.0  14.8% 337 39.1% 202.9  9.4% 302 
Southwest Airlines (WN) 28.8% 80.7  53.9% 685 55.0% 130.7  33.5% 780 62.5% 145.3  20.2% 408 
Source: Origin and Destination Survey 1989~1997;  
† Auto represents personal use vehicle such as (rental) car, pick-up truck, van, etc. 
* In parentheses is the percentage of each mode of transportation chosen by travelers in a distance band 
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Finally, the share equation to be estimated for airline i 4 on a route t  where N  
airlines are competing is 

−
=
−
=
⋅+
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where an airline brand dummy 1=firmijtD  if airline j  is ranked at thi  in revenue share, 
and a direct service dummy 1
...21
=
direct
taaa N
D  if NN adadad === ,...,, 2211  where 0=id  if 
thi ranked airline offers indirect service only and 1=id if 
thi ranked airline offers both 
direct and indirect service, or direct service only.5 For example, on a route t  where three 
carriers are competing, 1101 =
direct
tD  implies that the leading airline and Southwest offers 
direct service (either both direct and direct service or direct service only) and airline 2 
only offers indirect-only service.   
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 If we identify airlines by their names, total number of share equation system will grow faster as more 
airlines are competing on a route. For example, possible combination of 3 carriers for two-carrier route is 
3(= 23C ), and that of 10 carriers for two-carrier route is 45(= 210C ). In order to reduce the number of 
share equation system to be estimated, we label firms by their revenue share rank one quarter before 
Southwest (SW)’s entry. Suppose that before SW’s entry, airline x, y, and SW serve route A, and y, z, and 
SW serve route B. Also, the order of revenue share on route A and B is SW>x>y and y>SW>z, 
respectively. Then, airline x and y are named “1” (first in revenue share except for SW); airline y and z are 
labeled “2” (second in revenue share except for SW); and “3” (number of airlines on each route) will be 
given to SW. SW is to be labeled “total number of airlines on a route,” and its share equation is not 
estimated but derived from share equation system of rest airlines. In addition, on routes where the number 
of airlines remain unchanged after SW’s entry, the airline leaving with SW’s entry will be given “number 
of airlines on that route”, which will be allocated to SW as well. 
5
 
direct
t
direct
t DD 00...0011...11 ,  are dropped out in that all airlines offer services of same quality. 
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2.3 Data Description 
The data used for estimation of the airline firm price elasticity are the 
Department of Transportation’s Origin and Destination Survey (DB1A) for the first 
quarter of 1989 through the fourth quarter of 1997. The DB1A is a ten percent random 
sample of all tickets that originate in the U.S. and provides information on the carrier, 
origin and destination, dollar amount paid by each passenger, fare class and travel 
distance for each segment that passengers have traveled.  
Southwest’s entry provides a natural setting for investigating how travelers 
respond to the changes in air fares. More specifically, we can make full use of variations 
in the relative prices among airlines and the revenue shares of airlines by focusing on 
Southwest entry routes. Consequently, we focus on coach class travel in those markets 
where Southwest entered and has been serving since then. Table 2 breaks DB1A into 
three distance bands with 750 mile increments and compares average fares and Gini 
coefficients of fares over time both before and after Southwest’s entry.6 Southwest tries 
to expand its market by offering much lower fares than its rivals. In response to 
Southwest’s entry, incumbent airlines lower their fares by about $30 regardless of the 
distance of routes. Interestingly, rival airlines adjust their average fares upon 
Southwest’s entry and remain relatively constant in ensuing quarters. Consequently, in 
choosing which pre-entry quarter to compare with a post-entry quarter, it makes little 
difference. In addition, incumbent airlines fare dispersion measured by Gini index seems 
to not respond to Southwest’s entry. Figure 2 and Figure 3 confirm that the distribution  
                                                 
6
 Refer to Appendix A for the definition of Gini coefficient of fares. 
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Table 2. Average Fare and Fare Gini Before and After Southwest’s Entry 
Statutory Distance Between Origin and Destination City 
1-749 750-1499 miles 1500-    miles 
  
Mean 
Fare 
Mean 
Gini Obs 
Mean 
Fare 
Mean 
Gini Obs 
Mean 
Fare 
Mean 
Gini Obs 
4 Q before 144.5 0.167  1348 183.2 0.173  2478 228.3 0.196  1723 
3 Q before 141.8 0.166  1386 178.8 0.172  2462 231.5 0.196  1707 
2 Q before 145.8 0.158  1419 184.1 0.167  2518 237.7 0.188  1784 
1 Q before 141.5 0.164  1475 180.0 0.177  2583 232.0 0.194  1820 
1 Q after 108.0 0.170  2195 151.7 0.172  3425 206.7 0.187  2121 
2 Q after 108.2 0.169  2098 152.7 0.169  3355 209.5 0.189  2052 
3 Q after 110.1 0.165  2106 154.7 0.167  3318 210.4 0.187  1963 
Non-
Southwest 
4 Q after 109.8 0.169  2033 155.8 0.169  3182 214.8 0.189  1893 
1 Q after 80.7 0.114  671 130.7 0.068  760 145.3 0.101  365 
2 Q after 67.1 0.118  636 115.5 0.067  747 141.4 0.097  353 
3 Q after 67.8 0.107  636 117.4 0.057  741 142.7 0.096  351 
Southwest 
4 Q after 69.6 0.081  618 119.3 0.056  714 141.4 0.082  344 
 
 
 
of average fares and that of share are skewed more to the left after Southwest’s entry, but 
remains unchanged before or after Southwest’s entry.  
Table 3 shows how many incumbent airlines leave or entrant airlines enter when 
Southwest enters.7 In general, when Southwest enters a new route, one or none of the 
incumbent airlines leaves and one to two airlines enter other than Southwest. Due to the  
 
                                                 
7
  From DB1A, we define a route is entered by Southwest if travelers start and continue to take Southwest-
for example, Southwest is defined to enter Boise, ID to Portland, OR route at the last quarter of 1994 
because tickets by Southwest for this route has been observed since then. It should be noted that if no 
tickets by Southwest are observed, it could be either Southwest does not serve this route, or number of 
tickets sold by Southwest are so small that 10% random sample of those tickets is not drawn; however, we 
can not distinguish one from the other. 
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1 Quarter before Southwest’s entry 1 Quarter after Southwest’s entry 
 
 
2 Quarter before Southwest’s entry 2 Quarter after Southwest’s entry 
 
 
3 Quarter before Southwest’s entry 3 Quarter after Southwest’s entry 
 
 
4 Quarter before Southwest’s entry 4 Quarter after Southwest’s entry 
 
 
Source: Origin and Destination Survey 1989~1997 
For comparison reason, average fares of Southwest is excluded in figures for the quarters after 
Southwest’s entry 
 
Figure 2. Average Fare of Airlines on a Route: Histogram and Kernel Density 
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1 Quarter before Southwest’s entry 1 Quarter after Southwest’s entry 
 
 
2 Quarter before Southwest’s entry 2 Quarter after Southwest’s entry 
  
3 Quarter before Southwest’s entry 3 Quarter after Southwest’s entry 
 
 
4 Quarter before Southwest’s entry 4 Quarter after Southwest’s entry 
 
 
Source: Origin and Destination Survey 1989~1997 
For comparison reason, revenue share of Southwest is excluded in figures for the quarters after 
Southwest’s entry 
 
Figure 3. Revenue Share of Airlines on a Route: Histogram and Kernel Density  
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Table 3. Number of Airlines 1 Quarter Before/After Southwest’s Entry 
 
Number of airlines competing on a route 1 quarter after Southwest's entry 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 5 41 16 5                      
2 1 18 88 26 5                    
3   7 35 71 40 10 1                
4     9 54 109 45 15                
5     1 18 41 83 34 3              
6       2 13 38 72 22 4   1        
7         1 7 29 72 17 3   1      
8           1 8 17 32 11          
9               2 10 14 7 4      
10                 2 3 4 1 1 
Number of 
airlines 
competing    
on a route   
1 quarter 
before 
Southwest's 
entry 
11                 1 2   1      
Source: Origin and Destination Survey 1989~1997 
 
entry or exit of airlines, information on fares and number of travelers is not available for 
some quarters. The incomplete panel structure of the data makes it challenging to 
estimate demand using dynamic Almost Ideal Demand System model. Instead, for 
representing dynamic relationship between fare and revenue share incurred by 
Southwest’s entry, we chose observations one quarter before and after SW’s entry. In 
particular, we limit the number of airlines serving a route to from 1 to 8 airlines before 
SW’s entry and from 2 to 8 airlines after SW’s entry, and consider only routes where the 
number of airlines after SW’s entry is equal to or one more than before SW’s entry.8 
                                                 
8
 We first exclude routes where more than 8 carriers are competing after Southwest’s entry in that 
observations of those routes are not large enough to provide statistically meaningful estimation results. 
Among those routes where 8 or less carriers are competing after Southwest’s entry, we focus on two 
different types of routes. On one type of routes, no incumbent carriers drop out of the route, and therefore, 
the change in the number of competing carriers results entirely from Southwest entry. On another type of 
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These restrictions, which are imposed for tractability of the empirical model, account for 
about 68 percent of the total observations.  
 
 
2.4 Estimation Results 
Using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) proposed by Zellner (1962), our 
AIDS model with revenue share equation of (7) is estimated.9 In implementing our 
empirical model, we need to first consider the problem of the potential endogeneity of 
price. First, our expenditure share data across airlines for a particular route are 
aggregated from micro data, where the prices are exogenous to consumers. Second, 
airlines seem to determine fare schedule in advance and offers tens of different fares for 
the same route by imposing restrictions on tickets such as advance-purchase and 
Saturday night stay-over. Average fares in our estimation, therefore, are unlikely to be 
correlated with the error term in the demand equation.     
A second problem is that Southwest’s fare is unobservable before its entry. Yet, 
it is the period before Southwest’s entry and the period after entry that results in a large 
shift in Southwest’s share, which is critical for estimating the price elasticities. 
Consequently, it is useful to think of Southwest as having a high virtual price prior to 
entry that resulted in a zero share.10  
                                                                                                                                                
routes, only one incumbent carrier leaves the route in response to Southwest’s entry. Then, the net change 
in the number of competing carriers induced by Southwest’s entry equals zero. 
9
  We exclude routes whose daily total passengers are less than 10.  
10
  When number of airlines on a route is not changed by Southwest’s entry, we assume that Southwest 
replaces the airline that left with Southwest’s entry. For this route, the fare of the airline replaced by 
Southwest is used as a denominator for relative price before Southwest’s entry. 
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We first estimate the SUR model using observations for all routes after 
Southwest’s entry and observations for routes where one airline leaves with Southwest’s 
entry. Now, from the coefficients estimated, we can calculate Southwest’s virtual fare 
before its entry using information on fares and shares of other airlines. The following  
virtual fare formula is calculated from equation (7) by solving for the virtual fare that 
yields a predicted zero Southwest share in the pre-entry period as follows:   


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Table 4 indicates that the mean of Southwest’s estimated virtual fare is always greater 
than that of incumbent’s maximum fare. This high virtual fare supports our assumption 
of a Southwest zero revenue share before its entry. In effect, Southwest sets its fare too 
high to have positive share prior to entry. Given Southwest’s virtual fare, we then re-
estimate the SUR model using all observations both before and after Southwest’s entry.  
We discuss in detail the estimation results for those routes where three airlines 
are competing after Southwest enters. The first two columns of Table 5 provide 
estimates of the AIDS model for observations excluding those routes where no 
incumbent airlines drop out of in response to Southwest’s entry. Coefficients of airline 
dummies show that, when relative fares are being controlled, Continental, United and 
Delta will have 23.5 %, 17.5 % and 14.0 % more share than Alaskan or Expressjet. 
Further, if leading firm only offers direct service and Southwest provides indirect-only 
service, the incumbent airline will have at least 30.2 % more share than when its service  
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Table 4. Southwest’s Virtual Fare 1 Quarter Before Its Entry11 
 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SW's Virtual Fare 10 185 154 3 442 2 
Max Fare of Other Airlines 10 108 22 85 156 
SW's Virtual Fare 26 1602 2537 147 13059 3 
Max Fare of Other Airlines 26 255 115 97 649 
SW's Virtual Fare 34 2260 2352 132 14590 4 
Max Fare of Other Airlines 34 223 93 94 512 
SW's Virtual Fare 67 9036 10656 429 61230 5 
Max Fare of Other Airlines 67 252 92 111 673 
SW's Virtual Fare 69 11700 8865 107 31195 6 
Max Fare of Other Airlines 69 247 90 98 537 
SW's Virtual Fare 59 1.34E+16 5.78E+16 11186 3.57E+17 7 
Max Fare of Other Airlines 59 277 112 120 674 
SW's Virtual Fare 64 3.94E+25 2.54E+26 16 1.96E+27 
number 
of 
Airlines 
After 
SW's 
Entry 
8 
Max Fare of Other Airlines 64 285 101 117 695 
Source: Origin and Destination Survey 1989~1997 
 
 
is indirect only. Airline 2 will lose 9.0 % of its market share if the leading firm offers 
direct service and Southwest starts to provide direct service on that route.  
The last two columns of Table 5 offer estimates for observations which include 
Southwest’s virtual fare. In this case, the data sets include both pre- and post-entry. 
Being compared with the coefficients in the first two columns, there is no qualitative 
difference in coefficients. The estimated coefficient of own relative fare for airline 1 is -
0.208 and statistically significant, which implies that if airline 1 lowers its relative fare 
by 10 %, then its revenue share will increase by 2.08 % points. In addition, the 
coefficients for the constant, logarithm of expenditure and relative price, becomes  
                                                 
11
  Although Southwest’s virtual fare seems to be too large on routes where more than five airlines are 
competing, the level of virtual fare has little impact on regression results only if virtual fare is greater than 
maximum fare of other rival airlines.  
  
20 
Table 5. Estimation Results: 3 Airlines After Southwest’s Entry 
 
AIDS Model of Determinants of Share 
Without SW’s Virtual Fare With SW’s Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 1 Airline 2 
0.794 *** 0.474*** 0.883 *** 0.457 *** Constant (0.135)† (0.101) (0.093) (0.073) 
-0.071 *** -0.059 -0.078 *** -0.052 *** ( )PElog  (0.022) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) 
-0.164 * 0.041 -0.208 *** 0.058 ( )SWpp1log  (0.096) (0.050) (0.049) (0.040) 
0.041 -0.049 0.058 -0.052 ( )SWpp2log  (0.050) (0.051) (0.040) (0.037) 
0.305 ** 0.007 0.310 *** 0.012 indirectD110  (0.140) (0.093) (0.116) (0.086) 
-0.008 -0.090 0.019 -0.165 *** indirectD101  (0.084) (0.059) (0.059) (0.043) 
0.429 *** -0.231 *** 0.386 *** -0.227 *** indirectD100  (0.112) (0.068) (0.094) (0.063) 
0.055 0.072 0.024 0.086 indirectD011  (0.183) (0.125) (0.099) (0.072) 
-0.375 ** -0.260 * -0.338 ** -0.254 ** indirectD010  (0.185) (0.145) (0.160) (0.126) 
-0.108  -0.048 -0.128 -0.049 indirectD001  (0.075) (0.050) (0.051) (0.036) 
0.094 0.094 0.000  firm
AAD  (0.074) (0.074) (0.000)  
0.235 ** 0.235 ** 0.210 *** 0.210 *** firm
COD  (0.092) (0.092) (0.061) (0.061) 
0.140 *** 0.140 *** 0.105 *** 0.105 *** firm
DLD  (0.052) (0.052) (0.038) (0.038) 
0.078 0.078 0.064 0.064 firm
HPD  (0.070) (0.070) (0.053) (0.053) 
0.000  0.000  firm
NWD  (0.000)  (0.000)  
   0.163 * firm
QXD  
   (0.091) 
 0.000 0.012 0.012 firm
TWD  
 (0.000) (0.062) (0.062) 
-0.006  -0.077  firm
TZD  (0.157)  (0.116)  
0.175 *** 0.175 *** 0.151 *** 0.151 *** firm
UAD  (0.055) (0.055) (0.042) (0.042) 
0.060 0.060 0.016 0.016 firm
USD  (0.066) (0.066) (0.050) (0.050) 
0.248  0.191  firm
YVD  (0.142)  (0.112)  
Number of Obs 52 52 78 78 
R-square 0.5678 0.5706 0.6667 0.5953 
† Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
- Airline dummies firmASD and firmRUD  are omitted due to the problem of perfect collinearity.  
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statistically more important-their level increases and standard deviations decreases-as 
Southwest’s virtual fare is used. The rest of estimation results is reported in Appendix B. 
 
2.5 Price Elasticity and the Almost Ideal Demand System 
When N firms are competing in a market, the expenditure share equation of 
AIDS specification is: 
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A general definition of price elasticities from the AIDS specification is 
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where ijδ is the Kronecker delta equal to 1 when ji = and 0 otherwise. Given price index 
of equation (12), price elasticities derived from non-linear expenditure share equation 
are 
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In order to avoid non-linearity in our estimation equation, we use the following Stone 
price index as an approximation of the price index: 
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The linearly approximated AIDS specification proposed first by Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980a) raises a question of how to compute price elasticities in that the price index is a 
function of the expenditure shares which are the dependent variable of the AIDS 
specification. A common approach12 of computing formulas for price elasticities with 
parameters from the linear approximation AIDS model is   
j
i
i
i
ij
ijij s
ss
βγδε −+−=          (14) 
where expenditure share is assumed to be constant (i.e. ii spdPd =ln/ln ). The price 
elasticity calculated at the bottom stage represents cross-price elasticity, which measures 
substitution patterns between airlines “conditional” on the expenditure for air trip. 
 
2.6 Estimates of Price Elasticity 
The cross-price elasticities of each airline on routes with two through eight 
airlines are reported in Table 6.13 In case when three carriers are competing on a route, 
the cross-price elasticity of the leading firm is -1.30 and that of Southwest is -1.71. 
Southwest seems to have the highest cross-price elasticities on all routes regardless of 
the number of competitors. Also, cross-price elasticities tend to decrease with number of 
competitors. There are more competing airlines on longer-haul routes, which are  
                                                 
12
 See Green and Alston (1990), Ellison et al (1997) and Hausman and Leonard (2002). 
13
 All the vectors of cross-price on routes with 2 through 8 carriers are reported in Appendix C1 and 
Appendix C2. The differences in cross-price elasticities in Appendix C1 and in Appendix C2 are whether 
or not virtual fares of Southwest are used in estimating systems of share equations at the bottom stage.  
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Table 6. Estimates of Cross-Price Elasticities Conditional on Air Travel Expenditure 
Number of Airlines Competing on A Route After SW's Entry 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
-1.16‡ -1.30 -0.80 -1.11 -0.89 -0.85 -0.87 1 (0.39)† (0.09) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) 
-2.60 -1.21 -0.99 -1.05 -0.76 -0.94 -0.56 2 (1.46) (0.18) (0.31) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) 
 -1.71 -1.16 -1.15 -1.05 -1.18 -0.67 3 
 (0.08) (0.32) (0.13) (0.13) (0.18) (0.19) 
  -1.64 -0.91 -0.86 -0.75 -0.68 4 
  (0.25) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) 
   -1.63 -0.69 -0.86 -0.88 5 
   (0.06) (0.22) (0.16) (0.16) 
    -1.60 -0.01 -0.69 6 
    (0.06) (0.27) (0.20) 
     -1.14 -0.81 7 
     (0.02) (0.21) 
      -1.09 
Airline 
8 
      (0.01) 
† Standard errors, derived from the Delta method, are in parentheses. 
‡ All the cross-price elasticities are calculated using estimates of the AIDS model with Southwest’s virtual 
fare. 
- Shaded area represents cross-price elasticities of Southwest.  
* Airlines other than Southwest are defined by their revenue ranking and Southwest is defined as the 
number of airlines competing on a route. For example, if American, Delta and Southwest are serving a 
route and the ranking of revenue shares is American>Southwest>Delta, then American is named as “1”, 
Delta “2” and Southwest “3.” In the estimation of AIDS demand system, Southwest share equation is 
always omitted to singularity problem. Therefore, it seems natural to name Southwest as “the number of 
firms in a route” regardless of its rank in revenue share. This is why Southwest is named as “3” instead of 
“2” in this example. 
 
dominated by major airlines providing hub-and-spoke system. Frequent flyers programs 
of airlines with hub-and-spoke system are designed to provide consumers with 
incentives not to switch to rival carriers offering lower fares. Therefore, it is expected 
that on routes where airlines are competing with rivals in non-price factors, cross-price 
elasticities will be lower, other things held constant.   
Table 7 shows how cross-price elasticities of incumbent airlines respond to 
Southwest’s entry. On those routes where two or three airlines are competing after  
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Table 7. Estimates of Cross-Price Elasticities Before/After Southwest’s Entry 
Cross-Price Elasticities‡ Before SW’s Entry 
Number of Airlines Competing on A Route After SW's Entry 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
-1.09‡ -1.21 -0.99 -1.09 -0.91 -0.88 -0.88 1 (0.32)† (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) 
 -1.21 -1.14 -1.04 -0.79 -0.95 -0.59 2 
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
  -0.98 -1.14 -1.04 -1.17 -0.68 3 
  (0.23) (0.13) (0.12) (0.17) (0.18) 
   -0.91 -0.87 -0.77 -0.71 4 
   (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) 
    -0.66 -0.86 -0.88 5 
    (0.23) (0.15) (0.16) 
     0.05 -0.68 6 
     (0.28) (0.21) 
      -0.79 
Airline* 
7 
      (0.24) 
Cross-Price Elasticities‡ After SW’s Entry 
Number of Airlines Competing on A Route After SW's Entry 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
-1.26‡ -1.45 -0.97 -1.13 -0.87 -0.81 -0.85 1 (0.50)† (0.13) (0.17) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) 
 -1.21 -1.180 -1.06 -0.74 -0.94 -0.51 2 
 (0.18) (0.24) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
  -0.98 -1.16 -1.05 -1.19 -0.66 3 
  (0.24) (0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.20) 
   -0.90 -0.86 -0.73 -0.62 4 
   (0.18) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) 
    -0.71 -0.85 -0.88 5 
    (0.20) (0.17) (0.16) 
     -0.06 -0.70 6 
     (0.25) (0.20) 
      -0.83 
Airline* 
7 
      (0.19) 
† Standard errors, derived from the Delta method, are in parentheses. 
‡ All the cross-price elasticities are calculated using estimates of the AIDS model with Southwest’s virtual 
fare. 
* Airlines are defined by their revenue ranking and Southwest is defined as the number of airlines 
competing on a route.  
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Southwest’s entry, the entry of Southwest makes the cross-price elasticities of leading 
airlines in revenue share increase by 16 to 20 percent. Meanwhile, there seems to be 
little difference between cross-price elasticities of incumbent airlines before and after 
Southwest’s entry on the routes where four or more airlines are competing after 
Southwest’s entry. This results implies that the entry of Southwest makes the consumers 
of incumbent airlines more responsive to price changes by switching airlines when one 
or two existing airlines are competing against Southwest’s entry. 
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CHAPTER III 
DEMAND FOR AIR TRAVEL: INDUSTRY LEVEL 
 
3.1 Separability and Multi-Stage Budgeting14 
In Chapter II, consumers’ choice of airlines is analyzed conditional on the 
expenditure allocated to air travel. In this Chapter, we analyze consumers’ decision in 
the upper two stages: in the middle stage, transportation modes are determined given 
total amount of travel expenditure, which will be determined in the top stage. 
Specifically, we first determine the demand for air travel at the middle stage and then the 
demand for travel at the top stage. We assume a weak separability of preferences so that 
the AIDS model can be used for the following analysis of estimating demand for air 
travel and then demand for travel. 
Separable preferences can be represented by a direct utility function:   
( ))(),...,(),()( othersothersautoautoairair qvqvqvfqvu ==     (15) 
where v  is a strictly quasi concave, increasing and differentiable function, iv is a well-
behaved sub-utility function for each mode of transportation, and q is travel quantity (or 
frequency) vector whose subvector iq  represents quantity (or frequency)  of city-pair 
travels for each non-overlapping mode of transportation. The utility function of the form 
of equation (15) implies that, at the bottom level, demand for an airline j can be written 
as 
                                                 
14
 This section is largely from the chapter 5 of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b). 
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),(
, airairjairj pegq =         (16) 
where jairg ,  is a well-behaved demand function for airline choice, ie is the expenditure 
function for air travel and airp is the price vector of city-pair travels by airplane. Share 
equations of the AIDS model employed in Chapter II is based on the maximization of 
( )airair qv  subject to air
airj
jairjair eqp =
∈
,,
.  
In the middle stage, a representative consumer will maximize his utility function 
of the form (1) subject to the budget constraint 
 ( ) otherautoairiEpue
i
traveliii ,...,,,, ==      (17) 
where ( )iii qvu ≡  is the utility level of each transportation mode, ip is the price vector of 
city-pair travels in transportation mode i , and ie is the expenditure function for 
transportation mode i  which minimizes the amount of expenditure that is required to 
reach the utility level iu  at price vector ip , i.e., 
( ) ( ) otherautoairiuqvqppue
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iiijijiqiii i
,...,,,;min,
,,
=



	


== 
∈
   (18) 
In general, if no restrictions are imposed on ie  or iu , the maximization problem 
described by equation (15) and (17) requires the knowledge of all individual prices of 
city-pair travels in each mode of transportation.15 Empirically implementing empirically 
a mutli-stage budgeting approach would be more feasible if we are able to use a single 
price for each mode of transportation. Gorman (1959) proves that we may use a single 
                                                 
15
 This is not feasible due to the lack of sufficient data: The 1995 American Travel Survey (ATS) provides  
no information about how much consumers spent for city-pair travels in each mode of transportation, 
though it furnishes information about the share of air travel and auto travel. 
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price for each transportation mode if and only if the preference of the upper stage16 is 
additively separable.17 
In order to overcome Gorman’s highly restrictive condition on preferences, 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b) proposed an approximation solution in which only a 
single price of each transportation mode is needed under the less restrictive assumption 
of weakly separable preferences. The approximation solution starts with rewriting the 
expenditure function ie  in (16): 
 otherautoairi
pue
puepuepue
iii
iii
iiiiii ,...,,,),(
),(),(),( 00 =⋅=    (19) 
where 0ip  is a base period price vector of transportation mode i . The term ( )0, iii pue  is the 
amount of expenditure that is required to reach the utility level iu at base period price 
vector 0ip . This can be interpreted as a quantity index denoted by iQ where indirect utility 
function iu is given by ),( 0iii peu ψ= . The other term ),(
),(
0
iii
iii
pue
pue is a true cost-of-living 
price index for transportation mode i . This can be written as );,( 0 iiii uppP to emphasize 
its dependence on iu . A representative consumer then maximize  
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]000 ,,...,,,, airairaurautoautoautoairairaur pvpvpvfu ψψψ=    (20) 
subject to 
                                                 
16
 In our three stage model, the upper stage for the bottom stage and the middle stage is the middle stage 
and the top stage, respectively. In order for Gorman’s condition to hold, therefore, the preference for 
modes of transportation and for traveling should be additively separable. 
17
 A preference is additively separable if its corresponding utility function be written as 
)(...)()()( othersothersautoautoairair qvqvqvqvu +++==  
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 otherautoairiEuppPQ
i
traveliiiii ,...,,,);,( 0 ==⋅     ( 21) 
This standard form with matching indices of price ( iP ) and quantity ( iQ ) is still difficult 
to implement empirically because iP  is a function of ip so that we go back to the initial 
problem of the attainability of all individual prices. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b) 
suggest, however, that the exact price index involved in equation (21) can be 
approximated by commonly used price indices such as Laspeyres or Paasche indices, 
provided that consumers’ preferences are close to homothetic, that is, changes in price 
have almost identical impact on patterns of expenditure of households with different 
income levels.18 This approximate two-stage budgeting approach justifies the use of the 
AIDS model at the middle and top stage of our three-stage budgeting approach.   
 
3.2 Specification for the Middle Level: Demand for Different Modes of 
Transportation 
At the middle stage, consumers are to reveal their preferences on modes of 
transportation, conditional on travel expenditure being held constant. The American 
Travel Survey (ATS) 1995 conducted by Bureau of Transportation Statistics provides  
comprehensive information about characteristics of long-distance trip19 (of persons 
living in the United States of America), such as origin and destination of trips, principal  
                                                 
18
 In other words, Laspeyres or Paasche indices can be used for the exact price index involved in equation 
(5) if ( )iiii uppP ;, 0  is fairly close to 0ip , ( )iiii uppP ;, 0  is almost proportional to 0ip , or substitution between 
transportation modes is limited. 
19
 A trip is defined as each time a person goes to a place at least 100 miles away from home and returns. 
The following types of trips are excluded: (1) travel as part of an operating crew on a train, airplane, truck, 
bus or ship; (2) regular commuting to work or school; (3) one-way trips to move to a new residence; (4) 
trips by members of the Armed Forces while on active duty. 
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Table 8. Modes of Transportation by Distance 
 
Modes of Transportation One-Way Statutory 
Distance (miles) Auto† Airplane Bus Train Ship Others Total 
311,024 5,567 6,250 1,128 169 46 324,184 0-199 
(95.9%)* (1.7%) (1.9%) (0.3%) (0.1%) (0.0%)   
101,911 16,182 2,664 1,013 46 35 121,851 
200-499 (83.6%) (13.3%) (2.2%) (0.8%) (0.0%) (0.0%)   
24,538 21,574 787 240 20 18 47,177 
500-999 (52.0%) (45.7%) (1.7%) (0.5%) (0.0%) (0.0%)   
7,526 22,275 220 131 59 16 30,227 
1000-1999 (24.9%) (73.7%) (0.7%) (0.4%) (0.2%) (0.1%)   
1,518 12,645 38 51 60 7 14,319 
2000- 
(10.6%) (88.3%) (0.3%) (0.4%) (0.4%) (0.0%)   
446,517 78,243 9,959 2,563 354 122 537,758 All Distance 
(83.0%) (14.5%) (1.9%) (0.5%) (0.1%) (0.0%)   
Source: American Travel Survey 1995 
† Auto represents personal use vehicle such as (rental) car, pick-up truck, van, etc. 
* In parentheses is the percentage of each mode of transportation chosen by travelers in a distance band 
 
 
 
modes of transportation, reasons for trips, and demographic characteristics of members  
of household. Table 8 compiled from the ATS 1995 describes how the modes of 
transportation are distributed over distance. Auto20 is the mode of choice for shorter 
trips. Among 324,184 trips whose one-way statutory distance is less than 200 miles, 95.9 
percent of trips are made by vehicles such as car, van, pick-up truck and so on. This 
proportion declines drastically as the distance of travel increases. Auto is used for about 
90 percent of the trips with less than 500 mile distance, but it is used only for about 18% 
                                                 
20
 An auto trip is defined as any trip in which the principal means of transportation was car, pickup truck, 
or van; other truck; rental car, truck, or van; recreational vehicle or motor home. 
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of the trips of more than 1000 miles. On the other hand, airplane21 is used for about 80% 
of the trips of more than 1000 miles. This indicates a substantial substitution between 
auto and airplane as the distance of travel increases. 
Proportions of other transportation modes, such as bus or train, are extremely 
small, and hence, we will ignore them in the following analysis by assuming that only 
two alternative modes of transportation, auto and airplane, are available for the 
consumers to choose. The estimation of consumers’ choice between these two modes is 
based on the following AIDS model: 
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where airp and autop denote the prices of air travel and auto travel, respectively; 
expenditure of travel is the sum of air expenditure and auto expenditure,   
autoairtravel EEE += , and expenditure share of air travel
travel
air
air E
E
s = ; and price index 
for travel ( ) ( ) autoair sautosairtravel ppP ⋅= . Share equation (22) implies that determinants of 
revenue share of air travel are the relative price of air travel, total travel expenditure, and 
travel price index. 
It is important to consider the full prices of auto and air travels in the 
computation of relative prices because of the significant difference in traveling time 
between the two transportation modes. The full price consists of two components: the 
explicit price of travel and the opportunity cost of traveling time. The explicit price 
                                                 
21
 An airplane trip is defined as any trip in which the principal means of transportation was commercial 
airplane or corporate or personal airplane. 
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represents all the monetary costs for traveling such as air fares, costs of gas, etc. The 
opportunity cost of traveling time can be measured by the total amount of forgone wages 
for the period of traveling time. 
The explicit prices of auto and air travel are defined as the total monetary price 
paid for traveling per mile and per person in the travel party 
[ ] HH
travelauto
auto
licit
auto NDist
TCDistp 11exp ⋅⋅×=      (23) 
[ ] [ ] HH
travelair
HH
travelairHH
travelair
autoairportto
licit
air NDist
NFare
NDist
TCDistp 1111exp ⋅⋅×+⋅⋅×=
             
[ ] HH
travelair
HH
travelairautoairportto NDist
NFareTCDist 11 ⋅⋅×+×=   (24) 
where Dist is the statutory distance from the origin to the destination of travel autoTC  is 
the per-mile cost of driving and HH travelautoN  is the number of household members in the 
auto travel party. In the explicit price of air travel, airporttoDist  is the distance to the 
airport, HHtravelairN the number of household members in the air travel party, and 
Fare denotes the air fare per person. 
The term in the bracket in (23) is the total cost of traveling for the auto travel 
party, which is independent of the number in the travel party. Normalization by Dist  
and HH travelautoN  gives the cost of travel per person per mile. The total cost of air travel is the 
sum of the ground travel component, autoairportto TCDist × , which is independent of the 
number in travel party within the capacity limit of the vehicle, and the variable cost 
component, HHtravelairNFare× , which is proportional to the number in the travel party. To 
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be consistent with the definition of the per-person explicit price of auto travel, the air 
travel cost is also normalized by the numbers in the travel party and statutory distance. 
Such normalization of course does not affect the relative price between the two 
transportation modes for a travel party of given size. It does not affect the comparison of 
the relative prices faced by travel parties of different sizes, either. The normalization is 
purely for a convenience in interpretation of our analysis. 
The implicit price (opportunity cost of traveling) measure by the foregone wages 
due to the travel is computed by  
[ ] HH
travel
HH
adulttravel
HH
adultdriving
implicit
travel NDist
NWageTimep 11
,
⋅⋅××=    (25) 
where travel indicates either auto or airline travel, and HHadultWage  is the wage rate per 
minute of working persons in the household.22 Then, the full price is the sum of the two 
components 
implicit
travel
licit
traveltravel ppp +=
exp
       (26) 
 The inclusion of the implicit price implies that the income level will have a 
significant effect on the choice of transportation mode. A household of a higher income 
has a higher implicit price of auto travel and it can outweigh the lower explicit price of 
slower auto travel compared to a faster airline travel. Therefore, everything else being 
equal, a higher income household will tend to choose the airline travel more often than a 
lower income household. This tendency will be more pronounced as income increases. A  
                                                 
22
 Refer to Appendix A for how the wage rate per minute of working persons in the household is 
constructed. 
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Table 9. Modes of Transportation by Household Income 
Modes of Transportation 
Household Income 
Auto† Airplane Bus Train Ship Others Total 
15,204 1,390 728 130 6 9 17,467 
Less than $10,000 
(87.0%)* (8.0%) (4.2%) (0.7%) (0.0%) (0.1%)   
14,725 1,938 836 103 10 1 17,613 
$10,000-$14,999 
(83.6%) (11.0%) (4.7%) (0.6%) (0.1%) (0.0%)   
40,008 4,024 1,091 270 16 32 45,441 
$15,000-$24,999 
(88.0%) (8.9%) (2.4%) (0.6%) (0.0%) (0.1%)   
31,611 2,826 851 129 25 3 35,445 
$25,000-$29,999 
(89.2%) (8.0%) (2.4%) (0.4%) (0.1%) (0.0%)   
70,249 7,813 1,422 284 32 4 79,804 
$30,000-$39,999 
(88.0%) (9.8%) (1.8%) (0.4%) (0.0%) (0.0%)   
85,247 10,867 1,635 268 70 19 98,106 
$40,000-$49,999 
(86.9%) (11.1%) (1.7%) (0.3%) (0.1%) (0.0%)   
63,538 11,426 1,182 240 43 12 76,441 
$50,000-$59,999 
(83.1%) (14.9%) (1.5%) (0.3%) (0.1%) (0.0%)   
56,506 12,801 888 453 30 10 70,688 
$60,000-$74,999 
(79.9%) (18.1%) (1.3%) (0.6%) (0.0%) (0.0%)   
39,889 11,539 871 331 70 10 52,710 
$75,000-$99,999 
(75.7%) (21.9%) (1.7%) (0.6%) (0.1%) (0.0%)   
16,189 6,501 268 187 25 12 23,182 
$100,000-$124,999 
(69.8%) (28.0%) (1.2%) (0.8%) (0.1%) (0.1%)   
5,128 2,267 83 57 15 2 7,552 
$125,000-$149,000 
(67.9%) (30.0%) (1.1%) (0.8%) (0.2%) (0.0%)   
8,223 4,851 104 111 12 8 13,309 
$150,000 or more 
(61.8%) (36.4%) (0.8%) (0.8%) (0.1%) (0.1%)   
446,517 78,243 9,959 2,563 354 122 537,758 All Distance 
(83.0%) (14.5%) (1.9%) (0.5%) (0.1%) (0.0%)   
Source: American Travel Survey 1995 
† Auto represents personal use vehicle such as (rental) car, pick-up truck, van, etc. 
* In parentheses is the percentage of each mode of transportation chosen by travelers in each income band 
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Table 10. Modes of Transportation by Household Members in the Travel Party 
 
Modes of Transportation Household 
Members in the 
Travel Party Auto Airplane Bus Train Ship Others Total 
79,285 33,556 1428 1283 40 54 115,646 
1 
(68.6%) (29.0%) (1.2%) (1.1%) (0.0%) (0.0%)   
151,793 23,629 1566 669 122 26 177,805 
2 
(85.4%) (13.3%) (0.9%) (0.4%) (0.1%) (0.0%)   
71,976 7,569 422 240 46 19 80,272 
3 
(89.7%) (9.4%) (0.5%) (0.3%) (0.1%) (0.0%)   
74,882 6,643 384 200 58 5 82,172 
4 
(91.1%) (8.1%) (0.5%) (0.2%) (0.1%) (0.0%)   
36,154 2,750 132 91 33 6 39,166 
5 
(92.3%) (7.0%) (0.3%) (0.2%) (0.1%) (0.0%)   
32,427 4,096 6,027 80 55 12 42,697 
6 or more 
(75.9%) (9.6%) (14.1%) (0.2%) (0.1%) (0.0%)   
446,517 78,243 9,959 2,563 354 122 537,758 
Total 
(83.0%) (14.5%) (1.9%) (0.5%) (0.1%) (0.0%)   
Source: American Travel Survey 1995 
† Auto represents personal use vehicle such as (rental) car, pick-up truck, van, etc. 
* In parentheses is the percentage of each mode of transportation chosen by travelers in an income band 
 
 
 
cursory inspection of the 1995 ATS in Table 9 supports this conjecture. Consumers 
whose household income is less than $50,000 make 11.1 percent or less of their travel by  
air, while consumers whose household income is greater than $100,000 make at least 28 
percent of their travel by air. 
It should be also noted that the relative price of auto travel to the airline travel is 
a decreasing function of the number of household members in the travel party. 
Therefore, everything else being equal, travel parties with large members prefer auto 
travel to air travel. This can be seen in Table 10, where the percentage of auto travel is 
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monotonically increasing in the number of traveling party members up to 5 members. 
On the other hand, the percentage of airplane travel is monotonically decreasing in the 
number of traveling party members. 
 
3.3 Specification for the Top Level: Demand for Travel 
At the top stage, consumers decide how much of their income is to be allocated 
on travel. Let travelp and travelnonp − denote the average travel price per mile of all modes of 
transportation and the average price of all the goods and services other than travel, 
respectively. Each household will then face the following form of share equation of the 
travel: 
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traveltraveltravel loglog βγα    (27) 
where Income denotes the income level of households, the expenditure share of travel is 
Income
E
s
travel
travel =  , and the general price level P is defined by 
( ) ( ) travelnontravel stravelnonstravel ppP −−⋅=  where ( ) ( ) airauto sairsautotravel ppp ⋅= .  
Consumers’ decision on how much to allocate on travel depends partly on the 
relative price between travel and non-travel goods ( travelp  and travelnonp − ). Since travelp is 
not only a function of explicit costs of transportation but also of implicit costs of time 
spent traveling, it will vary across households with different income levels as well as 
with different preferences on modes of transportation. Each household will, however, 
face almost identical travelnonp −  because travelnonp −  represents overall price level P  except 
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for the travel and the effect of travelp  on P  seems to be negligible. Without loss of 
generality, therefore, we take the non-travel goods as a numeraire good and set its price 
to one, 1=
−travelnonp . Equation (27) can be then written as 






++=
P
Incomeps traveltraveltraveltraveltravel loglog βγα     (28) 
where traveltravel psP loglog = .
23
 
 
3.4 Data Description 
We use both airline industry data and travel survey micro data for the estimation 
of the choice between modes of transportation, and the choice of traveling or staying 
home. The airline industry data is compiled from the Department of Transportation’s 
Origin and Destination Survey (DB1A) of 1995, and the travel survey micro data is 
compiled from the 1995 American Travel Survey (ATS).  
The 1995 ATS was designed to answer the questions about where, how, why and 
when Americans travel and who travels. The survey involved interviews with 
approximately 80,000 randomly selected households nationwide, and gathered 
information on the origin, destination, volume, characteristics of long-distance travel in 
the United States, and demographic characteristics of all household members.24    
At the bottom level, we use each airline’s revenue share and its average fare at 
each directional level-for example, in the first quarter of 1995, Southwest’s revenue 
                                                 
23
 Estimated equation (27) with different normalizations of price of non-travel goods, say 
10010 orp travelnon =−  results in little difference in implied elasticities from it. 
24
 85 percent of households eligible for the survey respond to the 1995 survey.  
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share is 73.5 percent and 45.2% on a route from Los Angeles, CA to Oakland, CA and 
from Reno, NV to Las Vegas, NV, respectively. In order to match consumers’ decision 
at the bottom level with one at the middle level, we need complete information about 
number of passengers by air and auto, and the price of each mode at these routes. The 
1995 ATS, however, do not provide enough observations for number of travelers by 
each mode on these routes.  
We get around this problem by using the substitution pattern between auto and 
air travel over distance: auto is the mode of choice for shorter trips, while airplane is the 
mode most frequently used for longer trips. The statutory distance on a route from Los 
Angeles, CA to Oakland, CA and from Reno, NV to Las Vegas, NV is 337 miles and 
345 miles, respectively. Now that the distance of these two routes is close to each other, 
we can expect the substitution pattern between air travel and auto travel on these routes 
to be similar.  
We now assume that, on directional city-pair route level, statutory distance between 
origin and destination city is the only factor that relates consumers’ decision on which 
airline to take to their decision on which mode of transportation to use.  Then, we 
segment the distance of origin and destination city into 20 different distance blocks.25 
Given the distance of travel, consumers’ choice on the mode of transportation depends 
not only on the explicit costs of each mode but also on the opportunity cost of time spent 
on traveling by each mode which is supposed to be a function of income. To capture the 
                                                 
25
 We consider travels whose statutory distance is less than 2700 miles, which corresponds to the longest 
city-pair distance among those routes where Southwest was serving in 1995. Also, the segmentation of 
distance is designed such a way that each distance band has similar number of travelers. 
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variation in the opportunity cost of traveling time, as described in Table 11, we divide 
consumers into 12 different income groups just as reported in the 1995 ATS.26 Table 11 
shows that the percentage of air travel seem to increase monotonically as income level 
increases or the distance of travel increases. In addition, there seems to be little 
possibility of endogeneity between consumers’ decision on the travel mode and their 
income in that percentage of travels in each distance band remains constant across 
households with different income levels. In consequence, 240 different distance-income 
group observations are used for the estimation of consumers’ decision on the modes of 
transportation.27  
The price of each mode consists of two exclusive parts: explicit and implicit 
price. The implicit price of each mode is opportunity cost of time spent per mile per 
person: the time spent on air travel is derived from T-100 Segment by BTS and the time 
spent on auto travel is derived on the assumption that people drive at 60 miles per hour. 
In assessing the opportunity cost of time spent traveling, we extract from the 1995 Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) information on household income, working hours of 
head and wife. For example, let’s suppose a household which consists of a household 
head, wife, and a daughter. If both the household head and his wife work 3,000 hours a 
year and their household income is 60,000 dollars, then the opportunity cost of an hour 
for each of them is 10 dollars per hour. Also, now that their daughter’s decision on 
modes of transportation depends upon her parents income level, if she travels alone, her  
                                                 
26
 In the 1995 ATS, household income is reported as a category variable with 12 different income groups. 
We use the 1996 Consumer Expenditure Survey to calculate the average household income of each 
income group. 
27
 The AIDS specification allows us to aggregate individual data over distance and income pair without 
requiring further assumption on consumer’s preferences. 
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Table 11. Total Number of Air Travel and Its Percentage by Distance and Income 
Distance Household Income Total 
Min Max [0,10) [10,15) [15,25) [25,30) [30,40) [40,50) [50,60) [60,75) [75,100) [100,125) [125, 150) [150,    )  
1.0% 0.8% 1.2% 1.0% 1.4% 1.1% 2.9% 3.2% 2.4% 4.1% 3.8% 4.7% 2.0%   100 150 
5,151 4,705 12,229 9,851 22,401 25,742 20,201 18,183 12,822 4,971 1,545 2,693 140,494 32.8% 
1.1% 2.0% 2.5% 1.5% 2.2% 3.3% 3.6% 6.2% 4.6% 5.6% 5.2% 12.4% 3.7%   150 200 2,724 2,358 6,329 4,967 10,983 14,030 11,177 9,252 6,710 3,077 1,172 1,711 74,490 17.4% 
3.2% 7.9% 3.6% 2.9% 5.7% 5.2% 6.6% 12.4% 11.6% 19.4% 17.2% 21.6% 8.1%   200 250 1,198 1,251 3,758 2,717 6,827 8,087 6,511 6,314 4,672 2,022 518 1,224 45,099 10.5% 
6.3% 7.4% 6.2% 5.0% 4.8% 8.0% 10.8% 13.0% 16.8% 23.6% 30.4% 24.6% 10.5%   250 300 863 746 2,122 1,816 3,652 4,831 3,669 3,579 2,747 1,137 414 548 26,124 6.1% 
13.5% 17.3% 7.6% 8.3% 8.4% 12.8% 20.8% 17.8% 22.6% 30.5% 35.8% 41.6% 16.5%   300 350 579 619 1,545 1,264 2,706 3,205 2,884 2,325 1,906 914 316 543 18,806 4.4% 
10.1% 27.9% 11.8% 8.7% 15.7% 15.4% 17.6% 21.1% 33.1% 42.9% 60.7% 55.4% 21.0%   350 400 407 487 1,121 974 1,984 2,358 2,024 2,006 1,440 708 244 325 14,078 3.3% 
17.8% 23.3% 11.3% 10.9% 15.9% 24.7% 25.8% 28.0% 35.0% 43.5% 48.6% 56.9% 24.9%   400 450 303 330 887 662 1,607 2,101 1,600 1,337 1,123 584 138 267 10,939 2.6% 
13.9% 16.2% 20.1% 18.1% 23.3% 23.8% 31.4% 31.9% 37.0% 47.0% 53.2% 51.1% 28.6%   450 500 274 302 758 537 1,026 1,435 1,351 1,215 866 440 158 229 8,591 2.0% 
28.8% 34.3% 26.2% 25.9% 26.2% 27.9% 33.9% 41.1% 47.3% 62.8% 67.9% 57.6% 36.2%   500 600 319 420 1,129 881 1,901 2,373 2,126 1,920 1,758 792 252 413 14,284 3.3% 
33.9% 36.3% 34.6% 27.8% 37.0% 38.3% 50.7% 52.7% 57.5% 66.6% 72.5% 77.0% 46.4%   600 700 333 355 891 722 1,622 1,896 1,672 1,494 1,341 592 236 426 11,580 2.7% 
34.7% 40.7% 38.3% 35.2% 40.1% 47.7% 46.8% 54.8% 65.1% 72.3% 79.5% 81.7% 51.4%   700 800 196 241 624 463 1,119 1,371 1,166 1,198 995 531 161 371 8,436 2.0% 
40.0% 46.9% 38.3% 44.7% 49.5% 47.8% 54.9% 64.4% 67.4% 74.1% 69.7% 86.8% 56.5%   800 900 170 194 478 380 938 1,307 989 1,080 823 429 178 333 7,299 1.7% 
49.4% 59.0% 46.7% 44.7% 53.5% 59.3% 60.6% 66.9% 75.5% 72.5% 75.5% 88.8% 62.8%   900 1000 178 156 514 405 796 1,174 1,068 1,078 886 472 139 392 7,258 1.7% 
61.2% 60.7% 57.8% 54.5% 63.3% 62.2% 65.8% 73.5% 79.4% 82.1% 86.5% 90.3% 69.3%   1000 1200 227 336 725 552 1,489 1,694 1,793 1,750 1,463 671 223 642 11,565 2.7% 
56.3% 69.0% 63.2% 58.7% 64.6% 68.7% 76.8% 80.4% 87.8% 89.0% 92.4% 89.9% 74.8%   1200 1400 167 174 462 334 841 956 984 998 682 446 131 298 6,473 1.5% 
76.4% 82.4% 71.1% 72.6% 71.6% 86.7% 88.0% 84.6% 86.5% 89.6% 94.0% 94.3% 83.5%   1400 1600 110 142 401 266 627 858 723 877 783 365 150 280 5,582 1.3% 
82.7% 85.0% 74.8% 82.3% 76.9% 84.1% 88.6% 87.9% 92.2% 95.2% 95.2% 97.8% 86.7%   1600 1800 104 127 266 192 533 654 629 580 591 332 124 231 4,363 1.0% 
80.2% 85.6% 78.6% 75.8% 85.3% 83.9% 87.9% 87.7% 94.3% 96.0% 94.5% 92.6% 87.9%   1800 2100 106 104 224 198 448 607 684 659 611 377 128 299 4,445 1.0% 
72.7% 89.4% 92.1% 89.6% 87.1% 89.6% 90.1% 88.8% 92.9% 97.0% 94.1% 95.3% 90.8%   2100 2400 66 104 178 154 319 481 527 649 621 300 102 258 3,759 0.9% 
43.2% 90.4% 87.4% 95.8% 93.1% 89.5% 92.0% 93.7% 93.4% 94.3% 98.4% 94.5% 91.1%   2400 2700 148 114 182 144 321 506 511 764 747 368 127 344 4,276 1.0% 
10.4% 15.1% 11.6% 10.6% 12.7% 14.4% 18.6% 22.5% 26.5% 33.8% 36.6% 43.2%     
13,623 13,265 34,823 27,479 62,140 75,666 62,289 57,258 43,587 19,528 6,456 11,827 427,941   Total 
3.2% 3.1% 8.1% 6.4% 14.5% 17.7% 14.6% 13.4% 10.2% 4.6% 1.5% 2.8%     
Source: American Travel Survey 1995  
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opportunity cost of an hour spent traveling is assumed to be 10 dollars which is identical 
to what her father or mother should give up for an hour of traveling.  
In order to calculate the explicit price of auto travel, we use AAA’s annual 
driving cost estimates for 1999.28 Among factors considered for those estimates,29  we 
take into account the operating costs such as gas which depends on the distance of travel 
and other costs factors that do not depend on the distance of travel.  The explicit price of 
air travel is comprised of air fare and costs of driving to airport. The average air fare for 
each distance band is extracted from the 1995 DB1A, and the average distance to the 
airport for each distance band is derived from the 1995 ATS.  
Table 12 describes how each component of explicit and implicit price of air 
travel and auto travel varies over distance. The explicit cost of auto travel per person 
exceeds that of air travel when one-way distance of travel is greater than 1200 miles. 
Time saved by air travel get larger as the distance travel increases-a consumer can save 
more than 1200 minutes (or 20 hours) by using airplane if he travels more than 1600 
miles. Number of household members in the travel party for auto travel is greater than 
the number for air travel regardless of travel distance, and the difference between them is 
greater for short- or mid-haul travel.  
The explicit, implicit and full price of each mode of transportation by distance 
band is reported in Table 13. It should be noted that each price means what should be 
given up for a consumer to travel a mile. Now that consumers in our model are to decide  
                                                 
28
 AAA’s study calculates the average costs of all expenses associated with owning and operating a 
vehicle over five years and 75,000 miles of driving using a compact, mid-size and large vehicle.  
29
 Covered expenses include vehicle depreciation, insurance, fuel, tires, license, registration and taxes, 
vehicle financing, routine maintenance and repair. 
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Table 12. Components of Explicit and Implicit Price of Air Travel and Auto Travel 
Air Auto 
Distance Band Implicit Cost (Time Spent) Explicit  Implicit  Explicit  
Min Max Avg. Flying1 At Airport2 
To 
Airport3 
Time 
Total  Fare
4
 
People 
in the 
travel 
party5 
Time 
Driving6 
Gas + 
etc7 
People 
in the 
travel 
party5 
100 150 121 50 120 1 171 $66 1.4 121 $18 1.7 
150 200 173 60 120 3 184 $96 1.3 173 $24 1.7 
200 250 222 70 120 17 207 $65 1.2 222 $31 1.7 
250 300 272 78 120 26 225 $62 1.2 272 $38 1.7 
300 350 324 86 120 26 232 $82 1.2 324 $44 1.8 
350 400 373 96 120 26 243 $78 1.2 373 $51 1.8 
400 450 423 95 120 30 244 $84 1.2 423 $55 1.9 
450 500 474 104 120 22 246 $106 1.2 474 $64 1.8 
500 600 551 114 120 35 269 $113 1.2 551 $71 1.9 
600 700 646 122 120 28 270 $118 1.2 646 $88 1.8 
700 800 748 139 120 36 294 $138 1.3 748 $100 1.8 
800 900 848 149 120 42 311 $138 1.3 848 $112 1.9 
900 1000 947 159 120 34 313 $146 1.3 947 $126 1.8 
1000 1200 1091 178 120 39 337 $156 1.4 1091 $151 1.8 
1200 1400 1289 201 120 64 385 $174 1.4 1289 $179 1.8 
1400 1600 1496 225 120 38 383 $179 1.4 1496 $205 1.8 
1600 1800 1696 253 120 38 411 $195 1.4 1696 $236 1.8 
1800 2100 1943 275 120 38 433 $220 1.4 1943 $286 1.7 
2100 2400 2266 307 120 28 455 $234 1.4 2266 $347 1.6 
2400 2700 2528 336 120 27 483 $266 1.4 2528 $416 1.5 
1. Source: T-100 Segment; time flying = air time + ramp to ramp time  
2. Consumers are assumed to spend 120 minutes (or 2 hours) at the airport for check in and transition 
3. Source: American Travel Survey 1995 
4. Source: DB1A 1995 
5. Source: American Travel Survey 1995; average number of household members in the travel party 
6. Consumers are assumed to drive at the speed of 60 miles per hour for long distance travel 
7. Source: AAA’s annual driving cost estimates for 1995; only depreciation and operating costs are 
considered.  
 
 
 
which mode of transportation to use given the origin and destination of travel, we need 
to compare the price of air travel and that of auto travel in a distance band. When only  
explicit price is being considered, auto is cheaper way of transportation unless the 
distance of travel is greater than 1400 miles; but, when the opportunity cost of time spent  
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Table 13. Explicit, Implicit and Full Price of Air Travel and Auto Travel 
 
Distance Band Air Price1 (cents/mile) Auto Price2 (cents/mile) 
Min Max Avg. Explicit Implicit Full3 Explicit Implicit Full3 
100 150 121 51.59 28.22 79.81 14.62 17.81 32.43 
150 200 173 38.40 22.67 61.07 14.19 17.61 31.80 
200 250 222 31.66 21.31 52.97 14.31 17.57 31.89 
250 300 272 30.76 18.60 49.36 14.22 17.72 31.95 
300 350 324 27.20 15.68 42.87 13.89 17.04 30.93 
350 400 373 24.30 14.17 38.47 13.94 17.87 31.80 
400 450 423 24.24 13.34 37.58 13.33 16.33 29.65 
450 500 474 23.69 11.76 35.45 13.84 17.12 30.96 
500 600 551 21.74 10.62 32.37 13.34 16.43 29.76 
600 700 646 19.32 9.33 28.64 13.93 17.16 31.09 
700 800 748 19.39 8.35 27.74 13.62 16.86 30.48 
800 900 848 17.23 7.62 24.86 13.44 16.84 30.28 
900 1000 947 16.30 7.14 23.44 13.48 17.31 30.79 
1000 1200 1091 15.07 6.40 21.47 14.22 18.00 32.22 
1200 1400 1289 14.24 5.83 20.07 14.09 18.83 32.92 
1400 1600 1496 12.55 5.26 17.81 14.34 17.23 31.57 
1600 1800 1696 12.04 5.05 17.09 14.06 17.03 31.09 
1800 2100 1943 11.83 4.51 16.34 15.52 18.20 33.72 
2100 2400 2266 10.88 4.46 15.33 16.28 20.77 37.05 
2400 2700 2528 11.12 4.24 15.36 17.53 21.65 39.18 
1. Explicit and implicit price of air travel is derived from equation (8) and (9), respectively. 
2. Explicit and implicit price of auto travel is derived from equation (11) and (12), respectively.  
3. Full price = explicit price + implicit price 
 
 
 
traveling is considered as well, the threshold distance that air travel starts to have cost 
advantage drops to 600 miles. Unless the number of household members in the travel 
party is changed over distance, the explicit price of auto travel is supposed to remain 
constant across different distance bands. The reason that the explicit price of auto travel 
hits the lowest when travel distance is between 500 and 600 miles is because the number 
of household members in the travel party is the largest in that distance band. On the 
other hand, the implicit price of each travel depends not only on the number of 
household members working but also on total number of household members in the 
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travel party-given total number of hours spent traveling, the implicit price of each travel 
increases as more household members working or less total household members are in 
the travel party. The implicit price of auto travel is lower for mid-haul travel in that total 
number of household members in the travel party is smaller for short-haul travel and 
number of household members working in the travel party is larger for long-haul travel.  
When explicit prices of air travel and auto travel are being compared, airplane is 
the cheaper way of transportation if one-way statutory distance of travel is greater than 
1200 miles. Meanwhile, when both explicit and implicit prices of each mode are being 
compared, airplane is cheaper way of transportation if one-way statutory distance of 
travel is greater than 600 miles. The fact that air travel is preferred more when full price 
of each mode is compared explains why Southwest is more successful in competing with 
major incumbent airlines on short- or mid-haul distance routes-when compared to hub-
and-spoke system of major airlines, Southwest’s direct point-to-point service saves more 
flying time on relatively shorter-haul distance routes. 
 
3.5 Estimation Results 
In estimating AIDS revenue share equation of (22) and (28), we treat the prices 
of air travel and auto travel as exogenous variables. This is based on the following 
observations. The price of each travel consists of two parts: implicit price and explicit 
price. First, now that implicit price of each travel is a function of opportunity costs of 
time spent travel, implicit price is likely to be exogenous to consumers. Second, the 
explicit price of auto travel is a function of exogenous factors such as gas price and  
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Table 14. Estimation Results: To Fly or To Drive 
  AIDS Model of Determinants of Air Travel Revenue Share 
iS  Air Travel 
-0.053 
 Constant 
(0.115)† 
0.037*** ( )traveltravel PE /log   (0.009) 
-0.471*** 
 
( )autoair pp /log  
(0.014) 
Number of Obs 240 
R-square 0.8263 
F-statistics 563.55 
† Standard errors are in parentheses 
***=significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
depreciation rate of cars; and air fare, the major component of explicit price of air travel, 
seems to be determined in advance and to be offered in tens of different types with  
various restrictions such as advance-purchase and Saturday night stay-over. Hence, the 
explicit price of each travel seems to exogenous to consumers such that the price of each 
travel is unlikely to be correlated with error term in demand equation for the choice of 
mode of transportation.30  
The OLS estimates from equation (22) are reported in Table 14.  The estimated 
coefficient of relative price of air travel is -.471 and statistically significant, which  
implies that, if the price of air travel is lowered by 10 percent, then revenue share of air 
travel will increase by 4.71 percent points. The significantly positive coefficient on  
 
                                                 
30
 We can also assume that price of each travel is exogenous to consumers for our share equation is 
derived from utility maximization problem which assumes that prices are given to consumers. 
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Table 15. Estimation Results: To Travel or To Stay Home 
  AIDS Model of Determinants of Travel Revenue Share 
iS  Travel 
0.154*** 
 Constant 
(0.003)† 
-0.013*** ( )PIncome /log   (0.000) 
-0.003*** 
travelplog  (0.001) 
Number of Obs 44725 
R-square 0.069 
F-statistics 1653.87 
† Standard errors are in parentheses 
***=significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 ( )traveltravel PE /log  indicates that, as the expenditure on travel increases, consumers are 
more likely to travel by air.  
Table 15 reports the OLS estimates from equation (28). The estimated coefficient 
of relative price of travel is statistically significant and its value of -.003 indicates that 
revenue share of travel will increase by 0.03 percent in response to 10 percent reduction 
in the price of travel. The revenue share of travel is expected to fall as household income 
rises since the estimated coefficient of income is negative and statistically significant.  
One of the potential contributions of this work is to combine industry level data 
with micro survey data in estimating demand for air travel. In our model for consumers’ 
decision regarding travel, we assume that distance between origin and destination city is 
the only factor that matches consumers’ decision on which airline to take with their 
decision on which mode of transportation to use. Now that demand for each airline is 
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estimated using industry data and the demand for air travel is estimated using micro 
survey data, it is worthwhile to test how good the estimated demand for air travel is in 
predicting changes in industry data.  
Our data indicates that, one quarter after Southwest entry, the average fare of all 
airlines falls from $161 to $119 and the average number of passengers on a route rises 
from 584 to 1119.31  In other words, total number of air passengers increases by 62.8 
percent in response to the drop in air fare by 30.0 percent caused by the Southwest entry. 
The procedure described below is designed to answer the question-what is the expected 
change in air passengers from the estimated equation (6) if the price of air travel drops 
30 percent:  
1. Let’s assume the price of auto and overall price level of travel remains the same 
after Southwest’s entry. 
2. Air fare of $119 and $161 correspond to $203 and $244 in terms of full price 
which includes the opportunity cost of time spent traveling as well as air fare. 
Then, air price elasticity of total travel expenditure derived from the estimated 
equation is -1.72 such that, using midpoint theorem, the estimated total 
expenditure on travel increases to $158,520 from $114,799, which is derived 
from the ATS 1995.    
3.  Given the estimated total expenditure on travel of $158,520 after fare cut 
initiated by Southwest’s entry, we are now able to calculate expenditure share of 
                                                 
31
 The actual number of passengers would be ten times of these numbers for DB1A is 10 percent random 
sample of all tickets that originate in the U.S. 
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air travel after price change-58.94% under the assumption that the price of auto 
and overall price level of travel remains constant. 
4. The estimated revenue share of air travel allows us to let the price level of travel 
be changed such that the overall price level of travel falls by 3.26 percent. We 
then recalculate the expected revenue share of air travel after allowing the price 
of travel to be changed. The expected share of air travel turns out to be about 
58.94 percent under the assumption that the price of auto is not affected by the 
entry of Southwest. This implies that, in assessing predicted change in air 
passengers from the estimated equation (6), we may use the revenue share of 
58.94 percent for air travel. 
5. Now that the price of air travel, total expenditure on travel and revenue share of 
air travel after Southwest’s entry are $203, $158,520 and 58.9 percent, 
respectively, the predicted number of passengers taking airplane after price drop 
caused by Southwest’s entry is 461, while the actual number of air passengers is 
250 from the 1995 ATS. When midpoint theorem is used, the actual revenue 
share of air travel after Southwest’s entry derived from the 1995 DB1A increases 
by 62.8 percent, while the predicted revenue share of air travel after Southwest’s 
entry derived from the 1995 ATS increases 59.4 percent.  
 
Our industry data, which are used in estimating the demand for air carriers, indicates that, 
one quarter after Southwest’s entry, the total number of passengers on a route using 
airline increases by 62.8 percent in response to the fall in average air fare by 30.0 
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percent; but, on the other hand, the demand for air travel estimated using micro survey 
data predicts that, if air fare falls by 30.0 percent, total number of passengers using air 
travel will rise by 59.4.  
Our estimated demand for air travel seems to work well in predicting what is 
actually observed and, therefore, supports our assumption that distance between origin 
and destination city is the only factor that matches industry data to micro survey data.  
 
3.6 Conditional and Unconditional Price Elasticity in the Almost Ideal Demand 
System 
In our three-stage budgeting approach, cross-price elasticity is the price elasticity 
calculated at the bottom stage and measures substitution patterns between airlines 
“conditional” on the expenditure for air trip. On the other hand, industry elasticity, 
which is the price elasticity computed at the top two stages, captures substitution 
patterns between different modes of transportation “unconditional” on travel 
expenditure-that is, total expenditure on travel as well as relative prices between 
different modes of transportation are to respond to changes in the price of a mode of 
transportation.    
The formula that is used for the calculation of the price elasticity of demand for 
air travel and travel is  
air
travel
air
air
air
air pd
Ed
s ln
ln1 +−+−= βγε       (29) 
and  
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travel
travel
travel
travel
travel pd
Incomed
s ln
ln1 +−+−= βγε      (30) 
, which is derived from the AIDS share equation (22) and (28), respectively. At the 
middle stage, the last term of equation (28) disappears, i.e. 0
ln
ln
=
air
travel
pd
Ed
, because the 
total amount of money allocated to travel is given to consumers. If we consider both the 
middle stage and top stage together, however, the change in the price of air travel brings 
about the change in the travel expenditure and the price elasticity of air travel is no 
longer conditional on the travel expenditure. In order to put the middle and top stage 
together in computing the industry elasticity, we need to first consider the effect of the 
change in the price of each mode on total expenditure of travel:   
enditure
travel
price
travel
i
travel
travel
travel
travel
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travel
travel
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travel
i
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ε
⋅=⋅⋅=⋅=  (31) 
where price elasticity of travel 
travel
travelprice
travel pd
Qd
ln
ln
=ε , expenditure elasticity of travel 
travel
travelenditure
travel Qd
Ed
ln
lnexp
=ε , and =i air, auto.32 Combining price elasticity of travel 
expenditure with price elasticity of demand for different modes of transportation, we 
have the industry elasticity unconditional on travel expenditure: 
i
travel
j
i
i
i
ij
ijij pd
Ed
s
ss ln
ln
+−+−=
βγδε   
     
enditure
travel
price
travel
jj
i
i
i
ij
ij ss
ss expε
εβγδ ⋅+−+−= , =ji, air, auto    (32) 
                                                 
32
 At the middle stage, expenditure on travel is assumed to be constant such that the mode price elasticity 
of travel expenditure is zero, i.e.. 0=i
travel dpdE  
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where price elasticity of travel 
travel
travelprice
travel pd
Qd
ln
ln
=ε , expenditure elasticity of travel 
travel
travelenditure
travel Qd
Ed
ln
lnexp
=ε , and 1=ijδ if ji =  and 0=ijδ otherwise.  
At the top two stages, we introduce full prices of transportation modes and travel 
to rationalize consumers’ choice of transportation modes. The full prices depend not 
only to the monetary costs spent on traveling but also on the opportunity cost of time 
spent in traveling. Let licitip
exp and implicitip denote the explicit price (monetary cost) of 
travels by each mode and the implicit price (opportunity cost) of travels by each mode, 
respectively. The full price of air (or auto) travel, then, is implicitilicitii ppp += exp  such that 
explicit price elasticity is given by 
 ijimplicit
j
licit
j
licit
j
j
i
j
licit
j
licit
j
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εε



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exp
exp
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ln
  (33) 
where j
i
i
i
ij
ijij s
ss
βγδε −+−=  for =ji, air, auto.33 The explicit price elasticity of air travel 
computed in the following section accounts for how sensitive air travel is to the change 
in air fares. 
 
3.7 Estimates of Conditional and Unconditional Price Elasticity 
The price elasticities and expenditure elasticities estimated at the top two stages 
are reported in Table 16. The second and third column presents price elasticities and  
                                                 
33
 We assume that the opportunity costs of time spent in traveling is independent of the monetary costs of 
travel- i.e., 0/ exp =liciti
implicit
i dpdp . 
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Table 16. Price Elasticities and Expenditure Elasticities for the Top Two Stages 
The Middle Stage The Top Stage 
 
Price  
Elasticity 
Expenditure 
Elasticity  
Price  
Elasticity 
Expenditure 
Elasticity 
-2.06 1.08 -1.13 0.48 Air 
Travel (0.27)† (0.17) 
Travel 
(4.75) (3.24) 
-1.83 0.93 -1.02 1.01 Auto 
Travel (0.24) (0.15) 
Non-
Travel (0.15) (0.08) 
†Standard errors, derived from the Delta method, are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
expenditure elasticites of each mode, whereas the fifth and sixth column describes price 
elasticities and expenditure elasticities of travel and non-travel goods. The price 
elasticity of air travel and auto travel turns out to be around -2 and be similar to each 
other, while the expenditure elasticity of each mode seems to be unit elastic. The price 
elasticity of air travel measured at the middle stage represents industry elasticity 
conditional on the travel expenditure given to consumers. Meanwhile, if consumers’ 
decision at the top stage is considered in calculating the price elasticity of air travel, the 
changes in the price of air travel are allowed to influence the total expenditure on travel 
by affecting the relative price between travel and non-travel goods. The price elasticity 
measured at the middle and top stage represents the unconditional industry elasticity.  
Table 17 shows how the conditional (and unconditional) industry elasticities of 
air travel vary across different distance-bands. The fourth and fifth column report 
industry elasticity of air travel derived from the middle stage of our three-stage 
budgeting approach, conditional on total expenditure on travel; the sixth column presents  
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Table 17. Estimates of Conditional and Unconditional Industry Elasticity 
 
distance conditional industry 
elasticity 
unconditional 
industry elasticity 
min max 
revenue 
share of 
air travel full† explicit‡ 
travel 
expenditure 
elasticity 
travel 
(full) 
price 
elasticity§ full
†
 explicit‡ 
100 150 5.8% -9.14 -5.91 1.64 -1.16 -9.18 -5.94 
150 200 6.0% -8.86 -5.57 1.61 -1.14 -8.90 -5.60 
200 250 15.6% -4.05 -2.42 1.24 -1.14 -4.20 -2.51 
250 300 17.7% -3.70 -2.30 1.21 -1.13 -3.86 -2.41 
300 350 21.4% -3.23 -2.05 1.17 -1.13 -3.44 -2.18 
350 400 31.0% -2.55 -1.61 1.12 -1.13 -2.87 -1.81 
400 450 33.7% -2.44 -1.57 1.11 -1.13 -2.78 -1.79 
450 500 31.6% -2.52 -1.69 1.12 -1.10 -2.84 -1.90 
500 600 37.4% -2.30 -1.54 1.10 -1.12 -2.68 -1.80 
600 700 48.7% -2.00 -1.35 1.08 -1.11 -2.50 -1.69 
700 800 50.9% -1.96 -1.37 1.07 -1.10 -2.48 -1.74 
800 900 52.3% -1.94 -1.34 1.07 -1.11 -2.48 -1.72 
900 1000 56.2% -1.87 -1.30 1.07 -1.10 -2.46 -1.71 
1000 1200 63.1% -1.78 -1.25 1.06 -1.11 -2.45 -1.72 
1200 1400 67.3% -1.74 -1.23 1.05 -1.10 -2.44 -1.73 
1400 1600 70.9% -1.70 -1.20 1.05 -1.10 -2.44 -1.72 
1600 1800 74.1% -1.67 -1.18 1.05 -1.09 -2.44 -1.72 
1800 2100 75.4% -1.66 -1.20 1.05 -1.08 -2.44 -1.77 
2100 2400 76.9% -1.65 -1.17 1.05 -1.09 -2.45 -1.73 
2400 2700 82.4% -1.61 -1.16 1.04 -1.09 -2.47 -1.79 
† The conditional (or unconditional) full industry elasticity measures the sensitivity of demand to the 
change both in explicit cost of air travel and in opportunity cost of air travel.   
‡ The conditional (or unconditional) explicit industry elasticity measures the sensitivity of demand to the 
change only in explicit cost of air travel.  
§ To be comparable with (industry) price elasticities estimated at the middle level, travel price elasticities 
estimated at the top level is calculated in each distance band. 
¶ The unconditional industry elasticities are calculated using 
 
the expenditure elasticity of air travel derived from the middle stage; the seventh column 
describe price elasticity of travel calculated from the estimates of demand at the top  
stage; and the last two columns tell industry elasticity of air travel when the effect of 
changes in the price of air travel on travel revenue is considered by combining the upper 
two stages. Since price elasticity consists of explicit costs and implicit costs components, 
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industry elasticities for full price and industry (price) elasticities for explicit price are 
computed separately.  
 Both full and explicit industry elasticities conditional (or unconditional) on 
travel expenditure decrease as route distance increases and are relatively high on short-
haul routes. In addition, the difference between full industry elasticities explicit industry 
elasticities tells us consumers are more sensitive to changes in opportunity costs of time 
when they are traveling short distance. High full industry elasticity on relatively short-
haul routes explains why Southwest’s entry makes consumers switch from other modes 
of transportation on relatively short-haul routes. It offers lower fares and direct service 
on the basis of a point-to-point system such that consumers of Southwest could save on 
both the explicit cost and implicit cost of traveling.  
The indirect impact of price changes via changes travel expenditure gives rise to 
the difference between conditional and unconditional industry elasticities. On short-haul 
routes, the revenue share of air travel is so low that conditional and unconditional 
industry elasticities are almost identical. On the other hand, the difference between 
conditional and unconditional industry elasticities is relatively large on long-haul routes 
because  the revenue share of air travel is dominant on those routes.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE EFFECT OF PRICE ELASTICITY ON PRICE DISPERSION 
 
4.1 Price Elasticity and Price Dispersion 
In the standard textbook model of market structures, a monopoly firm may 
charge different prices to consumers with different price elasticities of demand, provided 
it is able to segment the market into different sub-groups of consumers and to prevent or 
limit resales by consumers who pay the lower price to those who pay the higher price. In 
a perfectly competitive market, firms have no market power to price discrimination-there 
exists only one price. From these two extreme cases, one could infer that in an 
imperfectly competitive market, the degree of price discrimination of a firm would 
increase as a market becomes more concentrated. Contrary to our intuition, theoretical 
works by Borenstein (1985) and Holmes (1989) provide formal models in which price 
discrimination may increase with market competition. 
Using a spatial model of monopolistic competition, Borenstein (1985) shows that 
the effect of market competition on the level of price discrimination by firms depends on 
the sources of price discrimination. He allows consumers to differ not only in their utility 
derived from a good (reservation prices) but also in their preferences between particular 
brands of that product.34 Conceptually, he identifies two sources of quantity sold when 
the price of a brand is lowered: (i) increase in total market sales and (ii) sales that switch 
from rival brands. In response to a change in the price of a brand, the latter accounts for 
                                                 
34
 In our study, goods represent modes of transportation, while brands represent services offered by 
different firms in a specific mode of transportation. 
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how sensitive are consumers who are choosing between different brands, while the 
former accounts for how sensitive are consumers who are choosing between a specific 
brand and no purchase. 
The distinction between two sources of change in quantity demanded enables us 
to analyze the effect of market competitiveness on the degree of price discrimination in 
monopolistically competitive markets. In order to model a monopolistically competitive 
market, he assumes that a market consists of two exclusive regions-a competitive region 
and a monopoly region. In the competitive region, all the consumers are responding to a 
price increase by choosing to buy from a rival brands, while in the monopoly region, all 
the consumers are responding to a price increase by choosing not to purchase a good. He 
then defines a market is more competitive if more consumers are in the competitive 
region. By assumption, consumers in the competitive region differ only in their 
preferences on brands but have similar reservation prices. Sorting mechanisms designed 
to distinguish consumers by their reservation prices are of no use in identifying 
consumers in the competitive region with different brand preferences. Therefore, one 
could predict that, if consumers are sorted by their preferences on brands, the level of 
price discrimination is expected to increase as a market becomes more competitive due 
to increased inter-brand competition.35  
The distinction between discrimination based on the tendency to switch brands 
from one based on the tendency to leave the market is first analytically formulated by  
                                                 
35
 On the other hand, when consumers are being sorted by their brand preferences, the level of price 
discrimination will be minimized if all consumers are in the monopoly region and be maximized if all 
consumers are in competitive region. 
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Table 18. An Example of Monopoly- and Competitive-Type Price Discrimination 
 Cross-Price 
Elasticity 
Industry 
Elasticity 
Price 
Elasticity 
Type A 1 1.5 2.5 Case 1 
Type B 1 0.5 1.5 
Type A 1.5 1 2.5 
Case 2 
Type B 0.5 1 1.5 
 
Holmes (1989). Using a symmetric duopoly model of differentiated products, he shows 
that in an oligopoly model, price elasticity ( priceε ) consists of cross-price elasticity 
( crossε ) and industry elasticity ( industryε ) such that 
industrycrossprice εεε +=         (34) 
and the price-cost markup formula is 
 industrycrosspricep
cp
εεε +
==
− 11
      (35) 
When a firm unilaterally increases its price of a good, the cross-price elasticity measures 
the tendency of consumers to move on to a competing firm or brand, while the industry 
elasticity captures the tendency of consumers to drop out of the market. By following 
Borenstein (1985), price discrimination is defined as “monopoly type” if discrimination 
between consumers is due to their differences in industry elasticity; price discrimination 
is defined as “competitive type” if discrimination between consumers is due to their 
differences in cross-price elasticity. 
In an example described in Table 18, type A consumers are more sensitive to 
price changes than type B consumers and therefore, if price discrimination is allowed, 
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they will be charged a lower price in equilibrium. Under the traditional price 
discrimination model (price discrimination based on the differences in price elasticity), 
each consumer type will pay identical equilibrium prices in both case 1 and 2. Even 
though each type of consumers has same aggregate price elasticity in both cases, the 
source of differences in price elasticity between each type is not alike. For example, 
consumers’ heterogeneity in the industry elasticity in case 1 yields distinction between 
different types of consumers, while heterogeneity in the cross-price elasticity in case 2 
causes distinction between different types of consumers. Under monopoly type price 
discrimination, consumers are sorted by their industry elasticity such that type B 
consumers will be charged a higher price only in case 1. Meanwhile, under competitive 
type price discrimination, price discrimination will only be observed in case 2 in 
response to differences in the cross-price elasticities. 
 Borenstein and Rose (1994) carry out an investigation empirically testing which 
type of price discrimination is practiced in the U.S. airline industry. Using a reduced 
form model of price dispersion in airline markets, they find price dispersion is correlated 
with more competitive structures.36 This result confirms the theoretical prediction of 
competitive type price discrimination, and indirectly shows that heterogeneity in the 
tendency of consumers to switch airlines is the sole or dominant determinant of price 
dispersion in airline markets.  
                                                 
36
 In their study, price dispersion refers to the variation in prices charged to different passengers by an 
airline on a route. The dispersion of fares in the airline industry results both from the variation in the costs 
of serving different types of consumers and from self-selective discriminatory pricing. Due to data 
limitations and possible correlation between costs of serving different consumers and discriminatory prices 
charged on heterogeneous consumers, it is difficult to empirically discern discriminatory pricing from cost 
variation as a source of price dispersion.    
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Borenstein and Rose (1994)’s seminal work can be viewed as incomplete 
because they only indirectly examine the relationship between price discrimination and 
two components of price elasticity-industry elasticity and cross-price elasticity. They 
provide little direct evidence to answer the question, whether the "industry" or "cross-
price" component of price elasticity is the primary determinant of observed price 
dispersion in the airline industry. The price-cost markup formula in equation (2) enables 
us to investigate directly the relationship between price dispersion and the industry and 
cross-price elasticity without requiring an assumption on consumer sorting mechanism. 
We extend Holmes (1989) model to investigate directly the relationship between 
the degree of price discrimination and distribution of cross-price elasticity and industry 
elasticity. Suppose two different types of consumers, A and B, and their cross-price 
elasticity and industry elasticity are industryi
cross
i εε ,  ( i =A, B) such that 
industry
i
cross
i
price
i εεε +=  ( i =A, B) where 0>> >crossBcrossA εε , 0>> industryBindustryA εε , and the 
proportion of A and B is p  and ( )p−1 , respectively. Since prices are monotonically 
decreasing in price elasticity in markup formula of equation (2), price differential is 
expected to be positively correlated with difference in the price elasticity of each group:   
( ) ( )industryBindustryAcrossBcrossApriceBpriceA εεεεεε −+−=−     (36) 
where difference in consumers’ preference on brands of a product, ( )crossBcrossA εε − , is the 
source of competitive type price discrimination, and monopoly type price discrimination 
is practiced based on difference in consumers’ valuation on the product, 
( )industryBindustryA εε − .  
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The structure of the DB1A data base, however, prevents us from estimating 
cross-price elasticities and industry elasticities of consumers in different groups 
separately in that DB1A provides no information on detailed restrictions imposed on 
tickets or purposes of air travels. Considering the fact that our estimates of price 
elasticity accounts for how average consumers of type A and B respond to the change in 
prices, we need to first look into the effect of mean price elasticity on price dispersion. 
Let µ andσ denotes mean and standard deviation of price elasticity, respectively. Then, 
mean of each component of price elasticity is 
( )pp jBjAj −⋅+⋅= 1εεµ , =j cross, industry     (37) 
, and standard deviation of each component of price elasticity is      
( ) ( )[ ]212 1 ppjBjAj −⋅⋅−= εεσ , =j cross, industry.37    (38) 
Now we consider the coefficient of variation of price as a measure for the variation in 
price charged to different consumers:  
 
µ
σ
=CV          (39) 
where  
( )pp BA −⋅+⋅= 1µµµ  
    ( ) ( )( )pp industryBcrossBindustryAcrossA −+++= 1εεεε  
( )( ) ( )( )pppp industryBindustryAcrossBcrossA −++−+= 11 εεεε  
    
industrycross µµ +=         (40) 
and  
                                                 
37
 We assume that total revenue from type A consumers is equal to that from type B consumers. 
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( ) ( )[ ]2122 )1()()( pp industryBcrossBindustryAcrossA −−++−+= µεεµεεσ
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]2122 ,cov2 industrycrossindustrycross εεσσ ++=     (41) 
 The coefficient of variation of price and mean price elasticity are comprised of 
industry elasticity, cross-price elasticity and percentage of each type. In order to examine 
the relationship between price dispersion and mean of industry and cross-price elasticity, 
we need to first analyze partial effect of each component on mean price elasticity and the 
coefficient of variation of price. From equation (4) and (8), =j cross, industry 
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We now can analyze the effect of mean cross-price elasticity and mean industry 
elasticity on price dispersion by inspecting the sign of following partial derivatives: for 
BAi ,= and industrycrossj ,= , 
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Equation (9) through (13) implies that as the mean of cross-price (or industry) elasticity 
falls, price dispersion will be expanded if price dispersion is caused by the variation in 
cross-price (or industry) elasticity of less price-sensitive consumers (type B) or the 
proportion of more price-sensitive consumers is relatively high, i.e. 
price
B
price
A
price
Bp
εε
ε
+
> . On the other hand, price dispersion will be compressed as the 
mean of cross-price (or industry) elasticity falls if price dispersion is caused by the 
variation in cross-price (or industry) elasticity of more price-sensitive consumers (type 
A) or the proportion of more price-sensitive consumers is relatively low, i.e. 
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Figure 4 shows how one-way fares of Delta airline from Los Angeles, LA to Salt 
Lake City, UT in the first quarter of 1997. The dashed line and the solid line represent 
mean fare and kernel density of one-way fares, respectively. Also, fares around first 
peak on the left are believed to account for fares charged on price-sensitive consumers, 
while fares around the second peak on the right are believed to account for fares charged  
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Source: DB1A 1997 
Dashed line represents mean one-way fare of Delta airline from Los Angeles, CA (LAX) to Salt Lake City, 
UT (SLC) in the first quarter of year 1997, while  solid line represents kernel density of one-way fares of 
Delta airline in that directional route.  
 
Figure 4. Fare Distribution of Delta Airline: From LAX to SLC; 1st Quarter of `97 
 
to price-insensitive consumers. In general, similar patterns in the distribution of fares are 
observed on our sample routes. There are two peaks-one for price-sensitive consumers 
and the other for price-insensitive consumers. Furthermore, the percentage of price-
sensitive consumers is greater than that of price-insensitive consumers. The distance 
between the peak for price-sensitive consumers and mean fare is about the half of mean 
fare, while the distance between the peak for price-insensitive consumers and mean fare 
varies across routes. In the following analysis, we assume that the portion of price-
sensitive consumers (type A) is greater than that of price-insensitive consumers and the 
level of price dispersion of an airline on a route relies on how far the peak for price-
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insensitive consumers is from mean fare. Based upon these assumptions, we expect that 
price dispersion is negatively correlated with the mean of industry elasticity or cross-
price elasticity.38  
 
4.2 The Effect of Price Elasticity on Price Dispersion: Empirical Results 
In order to measure the level of fare dispersion by an airline, we use a Gini fare 
index, which is highly correlated with the coefficient of variation of fares. On those 
routes where Southwest started to serve, the average of fare Gini index is 0.174, which 
implies that when two tickets of an airline on a route are randomly picked up, the 
expected absolute difference in fares of those two tickets is 34.8 percent of the mean fare. 
The largest Gini fare index of 0.525 means that the expected fare difference is 105 
percent of the mean of fare, while the smallest fare Gini index of 0 indicates that only 
one type of fare is offered.39  
We test whether the "industry" or "cross-price" component of price elasticity is 
the primary determinant of observed price dispersion in the airline industry by 
estimating the following equation: 
industrycross
fareGini εβεβα 21 ++=       (47) 
where fareGini  denotes Gini fare index, )0(>crossε  the (conditional) cross-price elasticity 
and )0(>industryε  the (unconditional) industry elasticity. If we assume that the percentage  
                                                 
38
 In addition, it is implicitly assumed that both industry elasticity and cross-price elasticity of price-
sensitive consumers are greater than those of price-insensitive consumers. 
39
 Among 6140 observations, 7.6% of Gini indices is zero which implies that an airline offers only type of 
fare on a route
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Table 19. Estimation Results: Cross-Price, Industry Elasticity and Fare Gini 
fareGini   
0.220*** 
 Constant 
(0.013) † 
0.049*** crossε   
(0.003) 
-0.008 industryε  
(0.007) 
Number of Obs 5526 
R-square 0.0529 
F-statistics 
 154.13 
†Standard errors are in parentheses 
***=significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
of price-sensitive consumers is greater than that of price-insensitive consumers and the 
heterogeneity in price-insensitive consumers is the primary source of variation in fare 
dispersion across routes, both industry elasticity and cross-price elasticity are expected 
to be negatively correlated with Gini fare index.  
Table 19 shows that cross-price elasticity of demand is the key factor affecting 
price dispersion of airlines. This result is consistent with the earlier findings of 
Borenstein and Rose (1994), but is considerably more rigorously rooted in the 
underlying theory. Statistically significant positive relationship between price dispersion 
and cross-price elasticity also indicates that in the airline industry, price discrimination is 
practiced to compete with rival carriers, not to compete with rival modes of 
transportation. Meanwhile, estimation results predict that if cross-price elasticity 
decreases by one, the expected absolute difference in fares between two randomly 
selected air tickets increases by 9.6 percent of the mean fare.  
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Table 20. Estimation Results: Cross-Price Elasticity, Distance and Fare Gini 
fareGini   
0.225*** 
 Constant 
(0.004) † 
0.048*** crossε   
(0.003) 
6.41E-06*** dist  
(2E-06) 
Number of Obs 5526 
R-square 0.0542 
F-statistics 
 1598.29 
†Standard errors are in parentheses 
***=significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
The estimated industry elasticities reported in Table 17 show little variation 
across mid- to long-haul routes, which could cause statistical insignificance of the 
industry elasticity. In order to compensate for possible incompleteness in estimating the 
unconditional demand for air travel, we substitute the distance of routes for the industry 
elasticity in that considerable substitution between airplane and auto is observed as the 
distance of travel varies. Now we estimate the following estimation equation: 
distGini crossfare 21 βεβα ++=  
where dist  denotes the statutory distance of routes. We expect the distance of routes to 
be positively correlated with fare dispersion because as the distance of travel increase, 
there exist less substitutes for air travel so that industry elasticity is likely to decrease.  
Table 20 indicates that the distance of travel has significantly positive effect on price 
dispersion, while the coefficient of cross-price elasticity remains significant and 
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unchanged.40 When the cross-price elasticity increases by one standard deviation, the 
Gini index increases by 0.019 which means that the expected difference of fares between 
two randomly chosen tickets increases by 3.8 percent of the average fare. On the other 
hand, one standard deviation of distance increases the Gini index by 0.004. This suggests 
that the cross-price elasticity is the dominant determinant of observed price dispersion 
due to discriminatory pricing in the airline industry. 
 
 
 
                                                 
40
 This result suggests that another way of estimating demand for air travel should be studied in the future 
work. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has examined the sources of price dispersion induced by price 
discrimination in the U.S. airline industry. There is a considerable body of work 
addressing the sources of price dispersion in an imperfectly competitive market. 
Specifically, Borenstein (1985) distinguishes price discrimination rooted in differences 
among consumers in their reservation prices of a good from that rooted in differences in 
consumers’ brand preferences. The follow-on work by Holmes (1989) decomposes a 
firm’s price elasticity of demand into industry elasticity and cross-price elasticity. When 
a firm unilaterally raises the price of its good, the industry elasticity captures consumers’ 
tendency to drop out of the market, while the cross-price elasticity measures consumers’ 
tendency to switch to rival brands. These two sources of price discrimination become 
known as “monopoly-type” price discrimination and “competitive-type” price 
discrimination.  
The most important investigation testing between these types of price 
discrimination is carried out by Borenstein and Rose (1994). Using a reduced form 
model of price dispersion in the airline industry, they show that price dispersion is 
positively correlated with the level of market competitiveness. This empirical finding is 
suggestive of competitive-type price discrimination, and indirectly shows that 
heterogeneity in the tendency of consumers to switch airlines is the sole or dominant 
determinant of price dispersion in the airline industry. On the other hand, Borenstein and 
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Rose’s (1994) seminal work can be viewed as incomplete because they only indirectly 
examine the relationship between price discrimination and the two components of price 
elasticity. In addition, they are unable to separate the industry elasticity and cross-price 
elasticity as the sources of price discrimination in their model.   
We test a model of price discrimination tied directly to Holmes (1989) which 
considers both industry and cross-price elasticity as sources of price discrimination. In 
particular, we attempt to directly test whether the industry or cross-price component of 
price elasticity is the primary determinant of observed price dispersion in the airline 
industry.  
Using the multi-stage budgeting approach with the almost ideal demand system 
(AIDS) specification, we first estimate demand for air travel at the airline level. More 
specifically, we divide the decision to travel into three stages: (1) the decision regarding 
the travel budget, (2) the decision to travel by auto or plane, and (3) the choice among 
carriers. This methodology permits a theoretically and empirically crisp separation 
between the industry and cross-price elasticities of demand. We use both airline industry 
data (for the bottom stage as well) and travel survey micro data for estimation of the 
choice between modes of travel, and the choice of traveling or staying home. In addition, 
to make full use of variations in relative prices and revenue shares, we focus on the 
routes where the Southwest airline entered.  
Southwest seems to have the highest cross-price elasticities on all routes 
regardless of the number of competitors. Also, the entry of Southwest makes the 
consumers of incumbent airlines more responsive to price changes by switching airlines 
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when one or two existing airlines are competing against Southwest’s entry. On the other 
hand, the cross-price elasticities tend to decrease with number of competitors. There are 
more competing airlines on longer-haul routes, which are dominated by major airlines 
providing hub-and-spoke system. Frequent flyers programs of airlines with hub-and-
spoke system are designed to provide consumers with incentives not to switch to rival 
carriers offering lower fares. Therefore, it is expected that on routes where airlines are 
competing with rivals in non-price factors, cross-price elasticities will be lower, other 
things held constant.   
To capture the role of the opportunity cost of time spent travel in consumers’ 
choice of transportation mode, we introduce a concept of the full prices of each mode of 
transportation. The full price consists of two components: the explicit price of travel and 
the opportunity cost of traveling time. The explicit price represents all the monetary 
costs for traveling such as air fares, costs of gas, etc. The opportunity cost of traveling 
time can be measured by the total amount of forgone wages for the period of traveling 
time.  
Both full and explicit industry elasticities conditional (or unconditional) on travel 
expenditure decrease as route distance increases and are relatively high on short-haul 
routes. In addition, the difference between full industry elasticities explicit industry 
elasticities tells us consumers are more sensitive to changes in opportunity costs of time 
when they are traveling short distance. High full industry elasticity on relatively short-
haul routes explains why Southwest’s entry makes consumers switch from other modes 
of transportation on relatively short-haul routes. It offers lower fares and direct service 
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on the basis of a point-to-point system such that consumers of Southwest could save on 
both the explicit cost and implicit cost of traveling.  
The indirect impact of price changes via changes travel expenditure gives rise to 
the difference between conditional and unconditional industry elasticities. On short-haul 
routes, the revenue share of air travel is so low that conditional and unconditional 
industry elasticities are almost identical. On the other hand, the difference between 
conditional and unconditional industry elasticities is relatively large on long-haul routes 
because the revenue share of air travel is dominant on those routes.  
We use the estimated components of price elasticities to investigate the 
determinants of price dispersion induced by price discrimination across airline routes. 
Following Borenstein and Rose (1994), we use the Gini coefficient of air fares to 
measure the degree of price dispersion. Our results show that cross-price elasticity of 
demand for air travel, reflecting competitive-type discrimination, is the key factor 
affecting price dispersion in the airline industry. This result is consistent with the earlier 
findings of Borenstein and Rose, but is based on a direct test of the underlying theory of 
Holmes. 
In order to compensate for possible incompleteness in estimating the 
unconditional demand for air travel, we substitute the distance of routes for the industry 
elasticity in that considerable substitution between airplane and auto is observed as the 
distance of travel varies. The distance of travel turns out to be significantly and 
positively correlated with price dispersion, while the coefficient of cross-price elasticity 
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remains significant and unchanged. This result suggests that another way of estimating 
demand for air travel should be studied in the future work. 
  
73 
REFERENCES 
 
Berry, Steven, Michael Carnall and Pablo Spiller. 1996. “Airline Hubs: Costs, 
Markups and the Implication of Customer Heterogeneity,” working paper no. 
5561. Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research.  
 
Borenstein, Severin. 1989. "Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the 
U.S. Airline Industry," 20 RAND Journal of Economics 344-365. 
 
Borenstein, Severin. 1985. "Price Discrimination in Free-Entry Markets," 16 RAND 
Journal of Economics 380-397. 
 
Borenstein, Severin and Nancy Rose. 1994. "Competition and Price Dispersion in the 
U.S. Airline Industry," 102 Journal of Political Economy 653-683. 
 
Deaton, Angus, and John Muellbauer. 1980a. “An Almost Ideal Demand System.” 70 
American Economic Review 312-326. 
 
Deaton, Angus, and John Muellbauer. 1980b. Economics and Consumer Behavior, New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ellison, Sara Fisher, Iain Cockburn, Zvi Grilliches and Jerry Hausman. 1997. 
“Characteristics of Demand for Pharmaceutical Products: An Examination of Four 
Cephalosporins,” 28 Rand Journal of Economics 426-446.  
 
Gorman, W. M. 1959. “Separable Utility and Aggregation, “ 27 Econometrica 469-481. 
 
Green, Richard and Julian Alston. 1990. “Elasticities in AIDS Models,” 72 American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 442-45. 
  
74 
Hausman, Jerry. 1996. “Valuation of New Goods under Perfect and Imperfect 
Competition,” in Timothy Bresnahan and Robert Gordon, eds. The Economics of New 
Products, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hausman, Jerry and Gregory Leonard. 2002. “The Competitive Effects of A New 
Product Introduction: A Case Study,” 50 Journal of Industrial Economics 237-263. 
 
Hausman, Jerry, Leonard, Gregory and Douglas Zona. 1994. “Competitive Analysis with 
Differentiated Products,” 34 Annales D’Economie et De Statistique 159-180. 
 
Holmes, Thomas. 1989. "The Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in 
Oligopoly," 79 American Economic Review 244-250. 
 
Reiss, Peter and Pablo Spiller. 1989. "Competition and Entry in Small Airline Markets," 
32 Journal of Law & Economics S179-S202. 
 
Zellner, Arnold. 1962. “An Efficient Method of Estimating Seemingly Unrelated 
Relations and Tests for Aggregation Bias,” 57 Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 348-367. 
 
 
  
75 
APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
 
Gini coefficient of fares ( fareGini ): fareGini  is computed using the following formula 
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where N  is total number of different fare level tickets issued by an airline on a 
route, ipax  is number of tickets sold at the fare level ifare  and total revenue is 

=
⋅=
N
i
ii paxfarerevenuetotal
1
. 
Wage rate per minute of working persons in the household ( HHadultWage ): HHadultWage  is 
defined as 
total
working
HH
working
HH
HH
adult MinuteN
IncomeWage
⋅
= . We extract from the 1995 Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) information on household income 
( HHIncome ), number of working persons in a household such as a household 
head and his wife ( HHworkingN ) and their total working minutes a year ( totalworkingMinute ) 
which is the sum of working minutes of each working person in a household. 
Each working person in a household is assumed to have the same opportunity 
cost of time spent traveling, which can be measured by the total amount of 
forgone wages for the period of traveling time. In addition, childre    
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APPENDIX B 
ESTIMATION RESULTS: AIDS MODEL OF DETERMINANTS OF SHARE 
FOR THE CHOICE OF CARRIERS 
 
 
Table B1. Two Carriers on a Route After Southwest’s Entry  
 
AIDS Model of Determinants of Share 
Without SW’s  
Virtual Fare 
With SW’s  
Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 1 
2.040 2.040 Constant (0.424) (0.424) 
-0.229 -0.229 ( )PElog  (0.079) (0.079) 
-0.300 -0.300 ( )SWpp1log  (0.116) (0.116) 
-0.174 -0.174 indirectD10  (0.091) (0.091) 
-0.304 -0.304 indirectD01  (0.092) (0.092) 
0.300 0.300 firm
DLD  (0.139) (0.139) 
0.631 0.631 firm
QXD  (0.172) (0.172) 
0.443 0.443 firm
TWD  (0.182) (0.182) 
Number of Obs 16 26 
R-square 0.9424 0.5468 
 F-Statistic 18.69  3.1 
† Standard errors are in parentheses. 
- Airline dummies firmAAD , firmCOD , 
firm
HPD , 
firm
NWD , 
firm
RUD , 
firm
UAD  and firmKND  are omitted due to perfect 
collinearity. 
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Table B2. Four Carriers on a Route After Southwest’s Entry  
 
AIDS Model of Determinants of Share 
Without SW’s Virtual Fare With SW’s Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 
0.106 0.483 0.354 0.177 0.399 0.251 Constant (0.118) (0.090) (0.071) (0.095) (0.070) (0.057) 
0.062 -0.035 -0.043 0.047 -0.026 -0.030 ( )PElog  (0.020) (0.014) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.009) 
0.135 -0.117 -0.055 0.036 -0.068 -0.063 ( )SWpp1log  (0.077) (0.056) (0.033) (0.059) (0.046) (0.027) 
-0.117 -0.005 0.050 -0.068 -0.040 0.068 ( )SWpp2log  (0.056) (0.059) (0.027) (0.046) (0.046) (0.022) 
-0.055 0.050 -0.016 -0.063 0.068 -0.001 ( )SWpp3log  (0.033) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.022) (0.021) 
0.219 -0.096 -0.031 0.213 -0.095 -0.059 indirectD1101  (0.067) (0.047) (0.035) (0.059) (0.042) (0.032) 
0.125 -0.003 0.002 0.125 -0.019 -0.016 indirectD1100  (0.086) (0.062) (0.044) (0.083) (0.060) (0.044) 
-0.383 -0.161 0.096 -0.154 -0.301 0.011 indirectD1011  (0.178) (0.131) (0.126) (0.127) (0.095) (0.066) 
0.262 -0.094 0.019 0.293 -0.103 0.007 indirectD1010  (0.099) (0.072) (0.059) (0.098) (0.071) (0.052) 
0.008 -0.140 -0.018 0.072 -0.174 -0.046 indirectD1001  (0.060) (0.043) (0.031) (0.052) (0.037) (0.028) 
0.143 -0.122 -0.005 0.141 -0.126 -0.015 indirectD1000  (0.056) (0.040) (0.029) (0.056) (0.040) (0.030) 
-0.138 -0.111 -0.010 -0.105 -0.132 -0.024 indirectD0101  (0.084) (0.061) (0.044) (0.071) (0.052) (0.037) 
0.007 0.036 0.000 0.015 0.013 -0.005 indirectD0100  (0.076) (0.068) (0.039) (0.077) (0.066) (0.040) 
-0.132 0.032 0.097 -0.132 0.032 0.106 indirectD0011  (0.115) (0.082) (0.059) (0.097) (0.069) (0.051) 
-0.056 -0.115 -0.029 -0.109 -0.075 -0.009 indirectD0001  (0.072) (0.053) (0.037) (0.056) (0.041) (0.029) 
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.038 0.038 0.038 firm
AAD  (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
0.018 0.018 0.018 0.040 0.040 0.040 firm
ASD  (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
 -0.009 -0.009  0.012 0.012 firm
COD  
 (0.052) (0.052)  (0.036) (0.036) 
0.020 0.020 0.020 0.045 0.045 0.045 firm
DLD  (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
0.019 0.019 0.019 0.037 0.037 0.037 firm
HPD  (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
-0.019 -0.019 -0.019 0.015 0.015 0.015 firm
NWD  (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
-0.035 -0.035 -0.035 0.000  0.000 firm
QXD  (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.000)  (0.000) 
-0.048 -0.048 -0.048 0.015 0.015 0.015 firm
QQD  (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
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Table B2. Continued. 
Without SW’s Virtual Fare With SW’s Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 
  -0.041    firm
RUD  
  (0.103)    
0.000   0.122  0.122 firm
TWD  (0.000)   (0.053)  (0.053) 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.021 0.021 0.021 firm
UAD  (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
  0.000  -0.062 -0.062 firm
USD  
  (0.000)  (0.040) (0.040) 
 0.127   0.174  firm
YVD  
 (0.104)   (0.092)  
Obs. 86 86 86 120 120 120 
R-square 0.4438 0.4995 0.4348 0.4429 0.5001 0.4025 
† Standard errors are in parentheses. 
- Quality dummies indirectD0010  is omitted due to perfect collinearity. 
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Table B3. Five Carriers on a Route After Southwest’s Entry  
 
AIDS Model of Determinants of Share 
Without Virtual Fare With Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 
0.376 0.489 0.273 0.099 0.403 0.529 0.277 0.137 Constant (0.121) (0.074) (0.057) (0.040) (0.080) (0.050) (0.036) (0.025) 
0.009 -0.053 -0.037 -0.013 0.008 -0.057 -0.030 -0.014 ( )PElog  (0.022) (0.014) (0.010) (0.007) (0.015) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) 
-0.056 -0.016 0.011 -0.013 -0.048 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 ( )SWpp1log  (0.059) (0.034) (0.025) (0.017) (0.040) (0.027) (0.019) (0.013) 
-0.016 -0.050 0.018 -0.002 -0.003 -0.022 0.018 -0.004 ( )SWpp2log  (0.034) (0.035) (0.020) (0.014) (0.027) (0.028) (0.015) (0.011) 
0.011 0.018 -0.007 0.012 -0.003 0.018 -0.021 0.003 ( )SWpp3log  (0.025) (0.020) (0.021) (0.011) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.008) 
-0.013 -0.002 0.012 0.012 -0.006 -0.004 0.003 0.004 ( )SWpp4log  (0.017) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) 
0.075 -0.040 0.045 -0.013 0.076 0.012 0.025 -0.011 indirectD11101  (0.105) (0.065) (0.048) (0.032) (0.093) (0.059) (0.042) (0.027) 
0.024 0.019 0.097 0.016 0.023 0.021 0.084 0.013 indirectD11011  (0.122) (0.074) (0.056) (0.036) (0.118) (0.073) (0.053) (0.034) 
-0.019 0.124 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 0.128 -0.017 -0.016 indirectD11010  (0.169) (0.101) (0.077) (0.049) (0.163) (0.101) (0.073) (0.047) 
0.002 0.022 -0.015 -0.028 -0.007 0.037 -0.011 -0.007 indirectD11001  (0.094) (0.057) (0.044) (0.028) (0.065) (0.040) (0.029) (0.019) 
0.241 -0.002 -0.014 -0.005 0.246 0.021 -0.013 -0.001 indirectD11000  (0.104) (0.063) (0.048) (0.030) (0.098) (0.061) (0.044) (0.029) 
0.161 -0.100 -0.047 -0.007 0.198 -0.110 -0.072 -0.027 indirectD10101  (0.127) (0.076) (0.058) (0.037) (0.088) (0.055) (0.040) (0.026) 
-0.074 0.139 0.072 -0.085 -0.056 0.134 0.029 -0.038 indirectD10100  (0.117) (0.060) (0.047) (0.035) (0.103) (0.060) (0.048) (0.028) 
0.059 -0.088 -0.021 -0.011 0.066 -0.081 -0.033 -0.025 indirectD10001  (0.074) (0.044) (0.034) (0.021) (0.047) (0.029) (0.021) (0.014) 
0.104 -0.035 0.027 -0.036 0.100 -0.047 0.036 -0.033 indirectD10000  (0.055) (0.033) (0.025) (0.016) (0.051) (0.032) (0.023) (0.015) 
-0.036 0.079 -0.010 0.071 -0.035 0.074 -0.009 0.069 indirectD01110  (0.168) (0.101) (0.077) (0.049) (0.163) (0.101) (0.073) (0.047) 
-0.136 0.109 0.051 0.023 -0.184 0.097 0.087 0.039 indirectD01101  (0.126) (0.075) (0.057) (0.036) (0.099) (0.061) (0.044) (0.029) 
0.074 -0.008 0.017 0.006 0.075 -0.011 0.011 0.005 indirectD01100  (0.101) (0.060) (0.046) (0.029) (0.097) (0.060) (0.043) (0.028) 
    0.087 -0.120 0.007 0.012 indirectD01011  
    (0.165) (0.103) (0.074) (0.048) 
0.031 0.279 -0.034 0.004 0.025 0.259 -0.020 0.001 indirectD01010  (0.171) (0.102) (0.078) (0.049) (0.164) (0.101) (0.073) (0.047) 
-0.252 0.099 0.032 -0.026 -0.174 0.052 0.015 -0.022 indirectD01001  (0.106) (0.064) (0.049) (0.031) (0.068) (0.043) (0.031) (0.020) 
-0.100 0.010 0.065 0.015 -0.100 0.005 0.066 0.015 indirectD01000  (0.087) (0.052) (0.040) (0.025) (0.084) (0.052) (0.038) (0.025) 
0.036 -0.164 -0.002 -0.047 -0.093 -0.106 0.007 0.010 indirectD00101  (0.171) (0.103) (0.078) (0.050) (0.099) (0.061) (0.044) (0.029) 
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Table B3. Continued. 
Without Virtual Fare With Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 
-0.088 0.018 0.097 0.024 -0.088 0.013 0.097 0.023 indirectD00100  (0.072) (0.043) (0.034) (0.021) (0.070) (0.044) (0.032) (0.020) 
0.075 0.039 0.046 -0.024 0.069 0.021 0.053 -0.021 indirectD00010  (0.088) (0.054) (0.040) (0.025) (0.085) (0.053) (0.038) (0.024) 
-0.126 -0.062 -0.021 -0.012 -0.125 -0.055 -0.021 -0.016 indirectD00001  (0.049) (0.030) (0.023) (0.014) (0.040) (0.025) (0.018) (0.012) 
0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 firm
AAD  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
0.098 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.000 0.000 0.000  firm
ASD  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 firm
COD  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 firm
DLD  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.000 0.000  0.000 firm
HPD  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018  0.000 0.000 0.000 firm
NWD  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.000   0.000 0.032  0.032 0.032 firm
QXD  (0.000)   (0.000) (0.030)  (0.030) (0.030) 
 0.073 0.073 0.073   0.000 0.000 firm
QQD  
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)   (0.000) (0.000) 
  0.000 0.000  -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 firm
RUD  
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 firm
TWD  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 firm
UAD  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 firm
USD  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
0.041    -0.041    firm
YVD  (0.188)    (0.104)    
   0.000 -0.036   -0.036 firm
KND  
   (0.000) (0.030)   (0.030) 
 0.000    -0.044  -0.044 firm
EVD  
 (0.000)    (0.026)  (0.026) 
Obs. 129 129 129 129 196 196 196 196 
R-square 0.2449 0.4475 0.3222 0.267 0.3388 0.3749 0.2863 0.2703 
† Standard errors are in parentheses. 
- Quality dummies indirectD00011  is omitted due to perfect collinearity. 
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Table B4. Six Carriers on a Route After Southwest’s Entry: Without SW’s Virtual Fare 
 
AIDS Model of Determinants of Share 
Without Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 5 
 0.270 0.096 0.249 0.057 Constant 
 (0.076) (0.053) (0.044) (0.041) 
0.063 -0.010 0.005 -0.033 -0.003 ( )PElog  (0.005) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) 
0.151 -0.127 0.028 -0.056 -0.015 ( )SWpp1log  (0.051) (0.033) (0.023) (0.017) (0.015) 
-0.127 0.098 0.018 0.028 -0.027 ( )SWpp2log  (0.033) (0.038) (0.020) (0.017) (0.014) 
0.028 0.018 -0.013 -0.015 -0.011 ( )SWpp3log  (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.012) (0.010) 
-0.056 0.028 -0.015 0.010 0.017 ( )SWpp4log  (0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.015) (0.009) 
-0.015 -0.027 -0.011 0.017 0.010 ( )SWpp5log  (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
-0.092 0.089 -0.006 0.010 0.016 indirectD111110  (0.099) (0.070) (0.048) (0.035) (0.031) 
0.505 -0.241 -0.144 -0.010 -0.021 indirectD111011  (0.145) (0.099) (0.068) (0.049) (0.050) 
0.154 -0.071 -0.050 -0.021 -0.043 indirectD111000  (0.139) (0.097) (0.066) (0.048) (0.042) 
0.289 -0.133 -0.057 -0.030 -0.019 indirectD110111  (0.082) (0.058) (0.040) (0.029) (0.025) 
-0.214 0.061 -0.126 0.003 -0.072 indirectD110101  (0.140) (0.101) (0.070) (0.050) (0.046) 
0.310 -0.048 -0.132 -0.022 -0.062 indirectD110100  (0.101) (0.070) (0.049) (0.035) (0.032) 
0.305 -0.209 -0.133 -0.036 -0.016 indirectD110011  (0.136) (0.093) (0.064) (0.046) (0.042) 
0.183 0.128 -0.105 -0.029 -0.046 indirectD110010  (0.139) (0.096) (0.066) (0.048) (0.042) 
0.183 -0.211 -0.106 0.001 -0.034 indirectD110001  (0.083) (0.061) (0.042) (0.030) (0.027) 
0.151 -0.075 -0.092 0.018 -0.047 indirectD110000  (0.100) (0.071) (0.049) (0.036) (0.032) 
0.271 -0.094 -0.109 0.024 -0.033 indirectD101111  (0.137) (0.095) (0.065) (0.047) (0.042) 
0.264 -0.066 -0.107 0.011 -0.038 indirectD101110  (0.137) (0.095) (0.065) (0.047) (0.042) 
0.078 -0.074 0.099 -0.061 0.013 indirectD101010  (0.136) (0.093) (0.064) (0.046) (0.041) 
0.092 -0.304 -0.144 -0.013 -0.038 indirectD101001  (0.142) (0.104) (0.070) (0.051) (0.045) 
0.342 -0.180 -0.007 -0.078 -0.043 indirectD101000  (0.139) (0.094) (0.065) (0.047) (0.042) 
 -0.209 -0.120 0.004 -0.012 indirectD100011  
 (0.095) (0.064) (0.051) (0.050) 
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Table B4. Continued. 
Without Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 5 
0.142 -0.086 -0.094 -0.025 -0.033 indirectD100001  (0.050) (0.035) (0.024) (0.018) (0.016) 
0.166 -0.009 -0.067 -0.038 -0.043 indirectD100000  (0.058) (0.040) (0.028) (0.020) (0.018) 
-0.170 -0.005 -0.028 0.049 0.013 indirectD010011  (0.138) (0.093) (0.065) (0.046) (0.041) 
-0.051 -0.037 -0.016 0.051 0.009 indirectD010001  (0.080) (0.055) (0.040) (0.027) (0.026) 
0.023 0.006 -0.037 0.030 -0.019 indirectD010000  (0.047) (0.032) (0.023) (0.016) (0.014) 
-0.107 -0.014 0.058 0.069 -0.004 indirectD001001  (0.098) (0.068) (0.047) (0.034) (0.030) 
-0.036 0.010 0.053 -0.012 -0.025 indirectD001000  (0.070) (0.049) (0.034) (0.024) (0.021) 
0.168 -0.061 0.029 -0.052 -0.026 indirectD000010  (0.080) (0.054) (0.037) (0.027) (0.024) 
-0.070 -0.055 -0.040 0.013 -0.003 indirectD000001  (0.036) (0.025) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) 
0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 firm
AAD  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
-0.019  -0.019  -0.019 firm
ASD  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035) 
0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 firm
COD  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 firm
DLD  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 firm
HPD  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 firm
NWD  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
-0.010  -0.010   firm
QQD  (0.050)  (0.050)   
  0.000   firm
RUD  
  (0.000)   
0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 firm
TWD  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 firm
UAD  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 firm
USD  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
   0.066  firm
ND9  
   (0.050)  
 -0.006 -0.006  -0.006 firm
EVD  
 (0.027) (0.027)  (0.027) 
Obs 133 133 133 133 133 
R-square 0.5082 0.3243 0.3961 0.4097 0.21 
† Standard errors are in parentheses. 
- Airline dummies firmZWD , firmJD 7  and quality dummies 
indirectD111121 , 
indirectD112112 , 
indirectD121121 , 
indirectD121211 , 
indirectD122121 , 
indirectD122211 , 
indirectD211221 , 
indirectD212121 , 
indirectD222121 , 
indirectD222122 , 
indirectD222211  are omitted due to perfect collinearity. 
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Table B5. Six Carriers on a Route After Southwest’s Entry: With SW’s Virtual Fare  
 
AIDS Model of Determinants of Share 
With Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 5 
0.002 0.306 0.118 0.184  Constant (0.091) (0.059) (0.043) (0.028)  
0.062 -0.020 -0.001 -0.025 0.003 ( )PElog  (0.016) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) 
0.079 -0.091 0.012 -0.033 -0.007 ( )SWpp1log  (0.044) (0.027) (0.020) (0.014) (0.011) 
-0.091 0.044 0.008 0.030 -0.008 ( )SWpp2log  (0.027) (0.028) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) 
0.012 0.008 -0.006 -0.014 -0.010 ( )SWpp3log  (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009) (0.008) 
-0.033 0.030 -0.014 0.008 0.012 ( )SWpp4log  (0.014) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) 
-0.007 -0.008 -0.010 0.012 0.011 ( )SWpp5log  (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
-0.109 0.110 -0.001 0.002 0.011 indirectD111110  (0.105) (0.067) (0.047) (0.032) (0.027) 
-0.078 0.003 -0.024 0.071 0.024 indirectD111101  (0.104) (0.067) (0.047) (0.032) (0.027) 
0.227 -0.071 -0.059 0.013 -0.011 indirectD111011  (0.105) (0.067) (0.047) (0.033) (0.028) 
0.180 -0.050 -0.059 -0.027 -0.063 indirectD111000  (0.107) (0.069) (0.048) (0.033) (0.027) 
0.291 -0.102 -0.047 -0.045 -0.038 indirectD110111  (0.085) (0.055) (0.039) (0.026) (0.022) 
0.015 0.199 -0.137 -0.014 -0.071 indirectD110110  (0.148) (0.095) (0.067) (0.045) (0.038) 
-0.239 0.081 -0.118 -0.016 -0.081 indirectD110101  (0.150) (0.096) (0.068) (0.046) (0.039) 
0.300 -0.041 -0.137 -0.025 -0.057 indirectD110100  (0.105) (0.067) (0.048) (0.032) (0.027) 
0.305 -0.198 -0.127 -0.045 -0.025 indirectD110011  (0.142) (0.090) (0.064) (0.043) (0.037) 
0.175 0.144 -0.087 -0.045 -0.066 indirectD110010  (0.145) (0.093) (0.065) (0.044) (0.037) 
0.131 -0.130 -0.091 -0.026 -0.052 indirectD110001  (0.059) (0.038) (0.027) (0.018) (0.015) 
0.161 -0.047 -0.078 -0.002 -0.053 indirectD110000  (0.105) (0.068) (0.048) (0.033) (0.027) 
0.307 -0.079 -0.104 -0.008 -0.043 indirectD101111  (0.103) (0.066) (0.046) (0.031) (0.027) 
0.291 -0.051 -0.095 -0.011 -0.049 indirectD101110  (0.143) (0.092) (0.065) (0.043) (0.037) 
0.281 -0.106 -0.090 -0.018 -0.054 indirectD101101  (0.144) (0.092) (0.065) (0.044) (0.037) 
0.538 -0.272 -0.152 -0.058 -0.052 indirectD101011  (0.148) (0.096) (0.067) (0.045) (0.038) 
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Table B5. Continued. 
With Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 5 
0.066 -0.057 0.094 -0.063 0.009 indirectD101010  (0.142) (0.091) (0.064) (0.043) (0.037) 
0.040 -0.233 -0.122 -0.037 -0.067 indirectD101001  (0.151) (0.097) (0.068) (0.046) (0.038) 
0.303 -0.147 -0.016 -0.074 -0.045 indirectD101000  (0.144) (0.092) (0.065) (0.044) (0.038) 
0.376 -0.176 -0.130 -0.012 -0.049 indirectD100101  (0.144) (0.092) (0.065) (0.044) (0.037) 
0.085 -0.197 -0.127 -0.020 -0.036 indirectD100011  (0.150) (0.096) (0.068) (0.046) (0.040) 
0.107 -0.071 -0.077 -0.027 -0.035 indirectD100001  (0.043) (0.028) (0.020) (0.013) (0.011) 
0.165 -0.012 -0.071 -0.037 -0.038 indirectD100000  (0.060) (0.039) (0.027) (0.018) (0.016) 
-0.081 0.039 0.036 0.026 -0.015 indirectD211221  (0.143) (0.091) (0.065) (0.043) (0.038) 
0.285 -0.096 -0.103 -0.060 -0.017 indirectD212121  (0.142) (0.091) (0.064) (0.043) (0.037) 
-0.078 -0.044 -0.034 0.043 -0.017 indirectD010011  (0.102) (0.066) (0.046) (0.031) (0.027) 
-0.011 -0.037 -0.027 0.028 -0.005 indirectD010001  (0.062) (0.040) (0.028) (0.019) (0.016) 
0.019 0.012 -0.034 0.026 -0.020 indirectD010000  (0.049) (0.031) (0.022) (0.015) (0.013) 
-0.051 0.036 0.029 0.007 -0.019 indirectD001001  (0.073) (0.047) (0.033) (0.022) (0.019) 
-0.041 0.021 0.058 -0.021 -0.031 indirectD001000  (0.074) (0.047) (0.033) (0.023) (0.019) 
-0.014 0.030 0.040 -0.019 -0.021 indirectD000101  (0.143) (0.092) (0.065) (0.044) (0.038) 
0.096 -0.125 -0.038 0.020 0.031 indirectD000011  (0.142) (0.091) (0.064) (0.043) (0.038) 
0.169 -0.063 0.028 -0.055 -0.023 indirectD000010  (0.083) (0.053) (0.037) (0.025) (0.022) 
-0.051 -0.067 -0.040 0.008 -0.010 indirectD000001  (0.034) (0.022) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) 
0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 firm
AAD  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
0.000    0.000 firm
ASD  (0.000)    (0.000) 
0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 firm
COD  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 firm
DLD  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 firm
HPD  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 firm
NWD  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
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Table B5. Continued. 
With Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 5 
   -0.003  firm
QQD  
   (0.031)  
  0.000   firm
RUD  
  (0.000)   
  0.041  0.041 firm
TWD  
  (0.021)  (0.021) 
0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 firm
UAD  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 firm
USD  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 firm
ND9  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
  -0.058   firm
JD 7  
  (0.039)   
 0.009 0.009  0.009 firm
EVD  
 (0.017) (0.017)  (0.017) 
Obs 202 202 202 202 202 
R-square 0.4799 0.3126 0.338 0.3733 0.231 
† Standard errors are in parentheses. 
- Airline dummy firmZWD  and quality dummy indirectD000100  is omitted due to perfect collinearity. 
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Table B6. Seven Carriers on a Route After Southwest’s Entry: Without SW’s Virtual 
Fare 
 
AIDS Model of Determinants of Share 
Without Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 5 Airline 6 
0.002   0.242  0.059 Constant (0.130)   (0.053)  (0.038) 
0.052 0.020 0.006 -0.045 -0.009 -0.020 ( )PElog  (0.021) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) 
0.087 -0.029 -0.008 -0.038 -0.019 -0.045 ( )SWpp1log  (0.066) (0.041) (0.032) (0.023) (0.017) (0.016) 
-0.029 0.022 0.029 0.007 -0.004 -0.016 ( )SWpp2log  (0.041) (0.048) (0.028) (0.021) (0.016) (0.015) 
-0.008 0.029 -0.026 -0.005 0.010 0.015 ( )SWpp3log  (0.032) (0.028) (0.031) (0.018) (0.013) (0.012) 
-0.038 0.007 -0.005 0.031 0.001 0.013 ( )SWpp4log  (0.023) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) 
-0.019 -0.004 0.010 0.001 0.018 0.000 ( )SWpp5log  (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) 
-0.045 -0.016 0.015 0.013 0.000 0.029 ( )SWpp6log  (0.016) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) 
-0.099 0.052 -0.124 0.004 0.004 0.084 indirectD1111101  (0.130) (0.117) (0.068) (0.049) (0.059) (0.039) 
-0.020  -0.040 0.054 -0.018 0.000 indirectD1111001  (0.131)  (0.068) (0.050) (0.036) (0.034) 
0.189 -0.164 -0.139 0.049 -0.010 0.017 indirectD1110001  (0.138) (0.159) (0.069) (0.053) (0.035) (0.036) 
0.106 -0.041 -0.071 0.025 -0.004 0.051 indirectD1110000  (0.098) (0.115) (0.051) (0.038) (0.037) (0.028) 
0.088 -0.245 -0.166 -0.032 -0.025 -0.020 indirectD1100011  (0.134) (0.089) (0.070) (0.051) (0.036) (0.035) 
-0.023 -0.120 -0.140 0.022 -0.019 0.010 indirectD1100001  (0.081) (0.056) (0.041) (0.032) (0.021) (0.021) 
0.024 0.079 -0.063 0.018 -0.001 0.001 indirectD1100000  (0.075) (0.051) (0.040) (0.028) (0.020) (0.019) 
0.086 0.032 -0.030 0.012 -0.039 -0.008 indirectD1001000  (0.091) (0.063) (0.049) (0.034) (0.025) (0.023) 
-0.010 -0.098 -0.082 0.023 0.002 0.011 indirectD1000001  (0.055) (0.037) (0.029) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014) 
0.136 -0.066 -0.025 -0.020 0.013 -0.007 indirectD1000000  (0.038) (0.026) (0.020) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) 
-0.008 0.005 0.028 0.005 0.008 -0.016 indirectD0110000  (0.075) (0.051) (0.040) (0.028) (0.020) (0.019) 
-0.297 -0.111 -0.074 -0.003 -0.016 -0.021 indirectD0100101  (0.127) (0.086) (0.068) (0.048) (0.034) (0.032) 
-0.036 0.015 0.045 0.016 0.030 -0.030 indirectD0100100  (0.126) (0.084) (0.067) (0.047) (0.034) (0.032) 
-0.121 0.000 0.005 0.041 0.050 -0.015 indirectD0100011  (0.126) (0.085) (0.067) (0.047) (0.034) (0.032) 
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Table B6. Continued. 
Without Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 5 Airline 6 
0.051 -0.157 -0.154 -0.085 -0.040 -0.054 indirectD0100001  (0.141) (0.099) (0.076) (0.055) (0.039) (0.037) 
0.151 -0.012 -0.033 0.030 -0.009 -0.013 indirectD0100000  (0.066) (0.047) (0.035) (0.025) (0.018) (0.017) 
-0.170 -0.008 0.147 -0.007 0.042 -0.017 indirectD0010100  (0.127) (0.085) (0.067) (0.047) (0.034) (0.032) 
-0.155 -0.025 0.114 0.021 0.065 0.026 indirectD0010000  (0.075) (0.051) (0.040) (0.028) (0.020) (0.019) 
-0.425 -0.151 0.109 0.069 0.041 0.024 indirectD0001101  (0.093) (0.062) (0.049) (0.035) (0.025) (0.023) 
-0.097 -0.028 -0.139 -0.066 -0.001 0.035 indirectD0001100  (0.127) (0.087) (0.070) (0.049) (0.035) (0.033) 
0.039 -0.036 -0.019 0.087 0.012 -0.016 indirectD0001000  (0.075) (0.050) (0.040) (0.028) (0.020) (0.019) 
-0.151 0.064 0.003 0.109 0.007 -0.011 indirectD0000101  (0.126) (0.085) (0.067) (0.047) (0.034) (0.032) 
-0.003 -0.011 -0.002 0.077 0.006 -0.009 indirectD0000100  (0.127) (0.085) (0.067) (0.047) (0.034) (0.032) 
-0.152 -0.033 0.011 -0.016 -0.007 0.001 indirectD0000001  (0.040) (0.027) (0.021) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) 
0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 firm
AAD  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 firm
COD  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
0.097 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.097 firm
DLD  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 firm
HPD  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
0.096 0.096 0.096 0.096 0.096 0.096 firm
NWD  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
 0.193     firm
KPD  
 (0.144)     
 0.218     firm
QQD  
 (0.089)     
  0.077  0.080 0.077 firm
RUD  
  (0.027)  (0.037) (0.027) 
0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099 firm
TWD  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 firm
UAD  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 firm
USD  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
     0.077 firm
YXD  
     (0.036) 
  0.000    firm
JD 7  
  (0.000)    
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Table B6. Continued. 
Without Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 5 Airline 6 
 0.057  0.057  0.057 firm
EVD  
 (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030) 
 0.032     firm
YVD  
 (0.067)     
Obs 109 109 109 109 109 109 
R-square 0.5178 0.2954 0.368 0.479 0.3601 0.2997 
† Standard errors are in parentheses. 
- Airline dummies firmASD , 
firm
TZD  and quality dummies indirectD1010001 , indirectD1001101 , indirectD1001001 , indirectD0110101 , indirectD0110001 , indirectD0010101 , 
indirectD0010001 , 
indirectD0001001 , 
indirectD0000011   are omitted due to perfect collinearity. 
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Table B7. Seven Carriers on a Route After Southwest’s Entry: With SW’s Virtual Fare 
 
AIDS Model of Determinants of Share 
With Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 5 Airline 6 
-0.187 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) -0.052 Constant (0.112) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) 
0.072 0.006 -0.008 -0.017 -0.022 -0.014 ( )PElog  (0.017) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
0.094 -0.042 -0.006 -0.018 -0.010 -0.030 ( )SWpp1log  (0.049) (0.030) (0.024) (0.016) (0.013) (0.011) 
-0.042 0.012 0.027 0.008 0.004 -0.012 ( )SWpp2log  (0.030) (0.032) (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) 
-0.006 0.027 -0.023 -0.006 -0.003 0.010 ( )SWpp3log  (0.024) (0.019) (0.022) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) 
-0.018 0.008 -0.006 0.018 -0.002 -0.001 ( )SWpp4log  (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) 
-0.010 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 0.006 0.006 ( )SWpp5log  (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) 
-0.030 -0.012 0.010 -0.001 0.006 0.027 ( )SWpp6log  (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
-0.156 0.376 -0.091 -0.023 0.081 0.156 indirectD1111101  (0.127) (0.137) (0.063) (0.045) (0.052) (0.036) 
0.017 0.332 0.006 -0.001 -0.004 -0.010 indirectD1111001  (0.094) (0.126) (0.046) (0.033) (0.025) (0.023) 
0.206 0.146 -0.098 -0.024 0.026 0.005 indirectD1110001  (0.132) (0.088) (0.064) (0.046) (0.033) (0.032) 
0.106 0.265 -0.041 -0.017 0.044 0.084 indirectD1110000  (0.094) (0.086) (0.047) (0.034) (0.033) (0.025) 
0.022 -0.216 -0.123 -0.049 -0.004 -0.034 indirectD1100011  (0.130) (0.084) (0.064) (0.046) (0.033) (0.031) 
-0.177 -0.032 -0.053 -0.026 0.000 -0.001 indirectD1100001  (0.059) (0.038) (0.028) (0.021) (0.014) (0.014) 
0.008 0.092 -0.053 0.008 0.007 0.000 indirectD1100000  (0.075) (0.049) (0.037) (0.027) (0.019) (0.018) 
0.320 -0.167 -0.094 -0.054 -0.011 -0.009 indirectD1010001  (0.094) (0.061) (0.047) (0.033) (0.024) (0.023) 
-0.165 0.033 0.032 0.062 0.077 -0.024 indirectD1001101  (0.126) (0.083) (0.063) (0.045) (0.032) (0.030) 
0.014 -0.051 -0.001 0.044 0.013 -0.014 indirectD1001001  (0.125) (0.082) (0.063) (0.045) (0.031) (0.029) 
0.074 0.041 -0.020 0.017 -0.041 -0.010 indirectD1001000  (0.090) (0.060) (0.045) (0.032) (0.023) (0.021) 
0.020 -0.100 -0.071 -0.006 0.000 -0.001 indirectD1000001  (0.042) (0.028) (0.021) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) 
0.123 -0.056 -0.018 -0.017 0.015 -0.005 indirectD1000000  (0.037) (0.024) (0.019) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) 
-0.120 0.005 0.041 0.069 0.072 -0.037 indirectD0110101  (0.126) (0.083) (0.063) (0.045) (0.032) (0.030) 
-0.022 -0.013 0.055 0.016 -0.015 -0.009 indirectD0110001  (0.125) (0.083) (0.062) (0.045) (0.031) (0.029) 
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Table B7. Continued. 
With Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 5 Airline 6 
0.002 0.005 0.021 0.009 0.007 -0.011 indirectD0110000  (0.074) (0.049) (0.037) (0.026) (0.019) (0.017) 
-0.333 -0.102 -0.047 -0.015 -0.002 -0.019 indirectD0100101  (0.126) (0.083) (0.063) (0.045) (0.032) (0.030) 
-0.038 0.018 0.047 0.030 0.024 -0.027 indirectD0100100  (0.125) (0.082) (0.062) (0.044) (0.031) (0.029) 
-0.130 0.004 0.011 0.052 0.045 -0.014 indirectD0100011  (0.125) (0.082) (0.062) (0.044) (0.031) (0.029) 
-0.263 -0.095 -0.047 -0.004 -0.013 -0.013 indirectD0100001  (0.074) (0.049) (0.037) (0.027) (0.019) (0.018) 
0.145 -0.001 -0.027 0.016 -0.007 -0.016 indirectD0100000  (0.065) (0.045) (0.033) (0.024) (0.016) (0.015) 
-0.158 0.050 0.129 -0.021 0.015 0.004 indirectD0010101  (0.126) (0.083) (0.063) (0.045) (0.032) (0.030) 
-0.186 0.003 0.162 -0.015 0.055 -0.020 indirectD0010100  (0.126) (0.083) (0.063) (0.044) (0.031) (0.029) 
-0.018 0.002 0.002 0.011 0.010 0.014 indirectD0010001  (0.075) (0.049) (0.037) (0.026) (0.019) (0.018) 
-0.166 -0.020 0.123 0.031 0.064 0.023 indirectD0010000  (0.074) (0.049) (0.037) (0.026) (0.018) (0.017) 
-0.455 -0.132 0.122 0.054 0.049 0.021 indirectD0001101  (0.091) (0.060) (0.045) (0.032) (0.023) (0.021) 
-0.104 -0.021 -0.137 -0.050 -0.017 0.036 indirectD0001100  (0.126) (0.083) (0.064) (0.045) (0.032) (0.030) 
-0.123 0.018 0.042 0.048 0.026 0.008 indirectD0001001  (0.066) (0.043) (0.033) (0.023) (0.016) (0.016) 
0.024 -0.033 -0.013 0.105 0.008 -0.013 indirectD0001000  (0.074) (0.049) (0.037) (0.026) (0.019) (0.017) 
-0.179 0.077 0.017 0.104 0.009 -0.011 indirectD0000101  (0.125) (0.082) (0.062) (0.044) (0.031) (0.029) 
-0.026 0.005 0.012 0.058 0.021 -0.012 indirectD0000100  (0.126) (0.082) (0.063) (0.044) (0.031) (0.029) 
-0.13291 0.081312 -0.01757 0.01445 0.031927 0.026992 indirectD0000011  (0.125) (0.082) (0.062) (0.044) (0.031) (0.029) 
-0.153 -0.032 0.005 -0.008 -0.004 -0.002 indirectD0000001  (0.034) (0.022) (0.017) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) 
0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 firm
AAD  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
(dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 0.099631 (dropped) firm
ASD  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.000) 
0.176 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.176 firm
COD  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
0.176 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.176 firm
DLD  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 firm
HPD  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
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Table B7. Continued. 
With Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 5 Airline 6 
0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 firm
NWD  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
 -0.006     firm
QQD  
 (0.105)     
  0.166  0.166 0.166 firm
RUD  
  (0.022)  (0.022) (0.022) 
0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 firm
TWD  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
0.181 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.181 firm
UAD  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
0.160 0.160 0.160 0.160 0.160 0.160 firm
USD  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
  0.139 0.139   firm
JD 7  
  (0.031) (0.031)   
 0.148  0.148  0.148 firm
EVD  
 (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
      firm
TZD  
      
 0.075     firm
YVD  
 (0.059)     
Obs 168 168 168 168 168 168 
R-square 0.5336 0.3265 0.3736 0.4526 0.3652 0.1966 
† Standard errors are in parentheses. 
- Airline dummies firmASD , 
firm
KPD , 
firm
YXD  are omitted due to perfect collinearity. 
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Table B8. Eight Carriers on a Route After Southwest’s Entry: Without SW’s Virtual 
Fare 
 
AIDS Model of Determinants of Share 
Without Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 5 Airline 6 Airline 7 
0.101 0.135 0.289  0.129  0.048 Constant (0.115) (0.079) (0.069)  (0.033)  (0.024) 
0.041 0.005 -0.023 0.011 -0.012 0.004 -0.007 ( )PElog  (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) 
0.118 -0.115 0.005 -0.016 -0.037 -0.026 -0.011 ( )SWpp1log  (0.068) (0.037) (0.035) (0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.011) 
-0.115 0.148 -0.004 -0.031 0.020 -0.030 0.007 ( )SWpp2log  (0.037) (0.043) (0.032) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017) (0.012) 
0.005 -0.004 0.061 -0.014 0.001 0.008 -0.009 ( )SWpp3log  (0.035) (0.032) (0.043) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.012) 
-0.016 -0.031 -0.014 0.037 0.009 0.018 0.009 ( )SWpp4log  (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) 
-0.037 0.020 0.001 0.009 0.014 0.000 -0.004 ( )SWpp5log  (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.009) 
-0.026 -0.030 0.008 0.018 0.000 0.030 0.016 ( )SWpp6log  (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.008) 
-0.011 0.007 -0.009 0.009 -0.004 0.016 -0.008 ( )SWpp7log  (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
 0.044 0.060 -0.030 -0.021 -0.016 0.009 indirectD11111000  
 (0.065) (0.060) (0.033) (0.030) (0.036) (0.020) 
-0.031 0.102 -0.045 -0.034 0.013 0.011 -0.004 indirectD11100100  (0.109) (0.066) (0.058) (0.034) (0.029) (0.025) (0.019) 
0.216 -0.078 -0.073 -0.063 -0.043 0.013 0.020 indirectD11100001  (0.110) (0.067) (0.059) (0.034) (0.029) (0.025) (0.019) 
0.009 0.077 0.036 -0.048 -0.020 -0.023 -0.007 indirectD11100000  (0.060) (0.037) (0.033) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.010) 
0.018 -0.110 -0.003 -0.065 0.043 -0.012 0.005 indirectD11010101  (0.110) (0.066) (0.059) (0.035) (0.029) (0.026) (0.019) 
0.003 0.050 -0.048 -0.033 -0.007 -0.032 0.005 indirectD11010001  (0.114) (0.070) (0.062) (0.035) (0.031) (0.035) (0.020) 
0.134 0.072 -0.136 -0.084 -0.004 -0.053 -0.013 indirectD11001101  (0.111) (0.067) (0.059) (0.034) (0.030) (0.026) (0.019) 
0.262 -0.120 -0.049 -0.082 -0.054 -0.058 0.002 indirectD11001000  (0.111) (0.067) (0.060) (0.035) (0.030) (0.026) (0.019) 
0.229 -0.011 -0.132 -0.077 -0.045 -0.035 -0.032 indirectD11000101  (0.109) (0.066) (0.059) (0.034) (0.029) (0.026) (0.019) 
0.131 -0.091 -0.129 -0.071 -0.017 -0.042 -0.015 indirectD11000001  (0.063) (0.043) (0.035) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.012) 
0.155 -0.014 -0.039 -0.035 -0.007 -0.008 -0.010 indirectD11000000  (0.056) (0.035) (0.031) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) 
0.117 -0.099 -0.160 -0.086 -0.032 -0.059 0.007 indirectD10100101  (0.112) (0.069) (0.062) (0.036) (0.031) (0.027) (0.021) 
0.127 -0.044 -0.054 -0.012 -0.024 -0.003 0.028 indirectD10100010  (0.109) (0.066) (0.059) (0.034) (0.029) (0.025) (0.019) 
-0.152 0.102 -0.018 -0.023 -0.024 -0.022 -0.003 indirectD10100001  (0.069) (0.042) (0.037) (0.022) (0.018) (0.016) (0.012) 
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Table B8. Continued. 
Without Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 5 Airline 6 Airline 7 
0.234 -0.097 -0.060 -0.062 -0.007 -0.008 -0.003 indirectD10100000  (0.054) (0.034) (0.030) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.010) 
-0.007 -0.116 -0.041 0.061 0.058 0.004 0.000 indirectD10010100  (0.109) (0.067) (0.059) (0.035) (0.030) (0.027) (0.019) 
0.031 -0.051 0.012 -0.035 0.009 0.017 0.035 indirectD10010010  (0.113) (0.069) (0.062) (0.036) (0.031) (0.027) (0.020) 
0.144 -0.073 -0.049 -0.020 -0.018 0.009 0.016 indirectD10010000  (0.082) (0.050) (0.044) (0.025) (0.022) (0.019) (0.014) 
0.019 -0.027 -0.097 -0.069 0.016 -0.026 0.010 indirectD10001001  (0.070) (0.044) (0.039) (0.022) (0.020) (0.017) (0.013) 
0.155 -0.027 -0.119 -0.063 -0.018 0.003 0.015 indirectD10000101  (0.110) (0.067) (0.059) (0.034) (0.029) (0.025) (0.019) 
-0.010 -0.043 0.061 -0.046 -0.026 0.033 0.024 indirectD10000100  (0.108) (0.065) (0.058) (0.034) (0.029) (0.025) (0.018) 
0.256 -0.234 -0.132 -0.048 -0.051 -0.003 -0.018 indirectD10000011  (0.110) (0.069) (0.061) (0.035) (0.031) (0.027) (0.020) 
0.102 -0.122 -0.091 -0.056 0.002 -0.018 0.000 indirectD10000001  (0.050) (0.032) (0.028) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.009) 
0.116 -0.044 -0.048 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 0.013 indirectD10000000  (0.048) (0.030) (0.026) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) 
-0.169 0.026 0.027 0.052 0.002 0.049 0.023 indirectD01011000  (0.109) (0.066) (0.059) (0.034) (0.029) (0.026) (0.019) 
-0.093 0.041 -0.009 0.007 -0.006 0.005 0.040 indirectD01010000  (0.080) (0.048) (0.042) (0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.013) 
0.022 0.021 -0.021 0.010 0.004 -0.001 0.012 indirectD01000010  (0.083) (0.051) (0.045) (0.026) (0.022) (0.019) (0.014) 
-0.058 -0.013 -0.019 0.021 0.029 0.022 0.007 indirectD01000001  (0.081) (0.050) (0.044) (0.026) (0.022) (0.019) (0.014) 
-0.325 0.058 -0.037 0.119 -0.011 -0.006 -0.026 indirectD00110001  (0.110) (0.066) (0.059) (0.034) (0.031) (0.026) (0.019) 
-0.164 0.035 0.026 -0.036 -0.051 -0.022 -0.006 indirectD00100000  (0.109) (0.066) (0.058) (0.034) (0.029) (0.025) (0.019) 
-0.137 0.043 -0.019 0.042 0.080 -0.032 0.006 indirectD00011000  (0.108) (0.065) (0.058) (0.034) (0.029) (0.025) (0.018) 
-0.042 0.033 -0.029 0.053 -0.015 0.020 0.011 indirectD00010000  (0.068) (0.041) (0.036) (0.022) (0.019) (0.016) (0.012) 
-0.148 -0.044 -0.126 0.028 0.018 0.000 0.002 indirectD00001000  (0.110) (0.066) (0.059) (0.034) (0.030) (0.026) (0.019) 
-0.226 -0.062 -0.076 -0.009 0.020 0.016 0.015 indirectD00000100  (0.110) (0.066) (0.059) (0.035) (0.030) (0.026) (0.020) 
0.078 -0.016 -0.031 -0.041 0.034 0.048 -0.001 indirectD00000010  (0.080) (0.048) (0.043) (0.032) (0.021) (0.019) (0.014) 
-0.097 0.047 -0.077 -0.027 -0.010 -0.003 0.006 indirectD00000001  (0.053) (0.033) (0.029) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.009) 
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Table B8. Continued. 
Without Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 5 Airline 6 Airline 7 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005  firm
AAD  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
 0.113      firm
ASD  
 (0.062)      
0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 firm
COD  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 firm
DLD  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 firm
HPD  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 firm
NWD  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
     0.025  firm
KND  
     (0.027)  
   -0.030    firm
QQD  
   (0.043)    
   0.000  0.000 0.000 firm
RUD  
   (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 firm
TWD  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 firm
UAD  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 firm
USD  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 -0.168 -0.168     firm
JD 7  
 (0.039) (0.039)     
     0.007  firm
EVD  
     (0.024)  
0.000       firm
FLD  (0.000)       
Obs 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 
R-square 0.623 0.5501 0.5059 0.5334 0.5976 0.5062 0.4589 
† Standard errors are in parentheses. 
- Airline dummy firmYXD  and quality dummies indirectD11110001 , indirectD11100101 , indirectD11100011 , indirectD11011001 , indirectD10101101 , indirectD10100011 , 
indirectD01100001 , 
indirectD01010001 , 
indirectD00010001 , 
indirectD00001001  are omitted due to perfect collinearity. 
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Table B9. Eight Carriers on a Route After Southwest’s Entry: With SW’s Virtual Fare  
 
AIDS Model of Determinants of Share 
With Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 5 Airline 6 Airline 7 
  0.261 0.088    Constant 
  (0.040) (0.025)    
0.049 0.016 -0.023 -0.010 -0.011 -0.004 -0.007 ( )PElog  (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
0.084 -0.045 0.007 -0.020 -0.023 -0.005 -0.002 ( )SWpp1log  (0.056) (0.029) (0.024) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.007) 
-0.045 0.078 -0.023 -0.004 0.006 -0.006 -0.006 ( )SWpp2log  (0.029) (0.026) (0.018) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) 
0.007 -0.023 0.037 -0.015 0.003 -0.008 -0.001 ( )SWpp3log  (0.024) (0.018) (0.023) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) 
-0.020 -0.004 -0.015 0.023 0.009 0.007 -0.001 ( )SWpp4log  (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
-0.023 0.006 0.003 0.009 0.006 -0.003 0.002 ( )SWpp5log  (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) 
-0.005 -0.006 -0.008 0.007 -0.003 0.011 0.004 ( )SWpp6log  (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) 
-0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004 ( )SWpp7log  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
0.079 0.067 -0.020 0.017 -0.015 0.010 0.004 indirectD11111000  (0.155) (0.070) (0.067) (0.034) (0.030) (0.031) (0.016) 
-0.039 0.023 -0.052 0.013 0.052 -0.001 0.015 indirectD11110001  (0.118) (0.068) (0.053) (0.033) (0.028) (0.024) (0.015) 
0.045 0.103 -0.075 -0.020 -0.020 -0.013 0.000 indirectD11100101  (0.089) (0.051) (0.039) (0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.011) 
-0.064 0.131 -0.046 -0.024 0.018 0.021 0.004 indirectD11100100  (0.119) (0.068) (0.053) (0.032) (0.028) (0.024) (0.015) 
0.280 0.013 -0.130 -0.044 -0.051 -0.027 -0.017 indirectD11100011  (0.119) (0.068) (0.053) (0.033) (0.029) (0.024) (0.015) 
0.044 0.012 -0.026 -0.030 -0.017 0.012 0.016 indirectD11100001  (0.088) (0.051) (0.039) (0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.011) 
0.003 0.090 0.028 -0.041 -0.018 -0.018 -0.007 indirectD11100000  (0.067) (0.038) (0.029) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.009) 
0.101 -0.010 -0.067 -0.028 -0.015 -0.010 -0.004 indirectD11011001  (0.120) (0.089) (0.065) (0.033) (0.029) (0.030) (0.015) 
0.001 -0.091 -0.019 -0.044 0.048 -0.002 0.007 indirectD11010101  (0.120) (0.069) (0.053) (0.033) (0.029) (0.025) (0.015) 
0.160 0.010 -0.106 -0.032 -0.016 -0.024 -0.006 indirectD11010001  (0.102) (0.052) (0.044) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) (0.012) 
0.200 -0.009 -0.133 -0.072 -0.018 -0.024 -0.008 indirectD11001101  (0.089) (0.051) (0.039) (0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.012) 
0.216 -0.065 -0.048 -0.073 -0.052 -0.040 0.000 indirectD11001000  (0.120) (0.069) (0.053) (0.033) (0.029) (0.025) (0.015) 
-0.016 0.023 -0.062 -0.029 -0.002 0.003 0.009 indirectD11000101  (0.076) (0.044) (0.034) (0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.010) 
0.127 -0.100 -0.141 -0.047 -0.018 -0.021 -0.011 indirectD11000001  (0.062) (0.037) (0.029) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.008) 
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Table B9. Continued. 
With Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 5 Airline 6 Airline 7 
0.150 0.000 -0.052 -0.028 -0.007 -0.004 -0.007 indirectD11000000  (0.062) (0.035) (0.027) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.008) 
0.062 -0.070 -0.141 -0.059 -0.037 -0.023 0.002 indirectD10100101  (0.120) (0.069) (0.053) (0.033) (0.029) (0.025) (0.016) 
0.155 -0.066 -0.075 -0.018 0.002 0.003 0.018 indirectD10100011  (0.119) (0.068) (0.053) (0.033) (0.029) (0.024) (0.015) 
0.112 -0.017 -0.074 -0.003 -0.019 0.000 0.030 indirectD10100010  (0.119) (0.068) (0.053) (0.033) (0.029) (0.024) (0.015) 
-0.033 0.037 -0.056 -0.030 -0.024 -0.022 -0.002 indirectD10100001  (0.064) (0.036) (0.028) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.008) 
0.229 -0.080 -0.071 -0.049 -0.008 -0.001 0.002 indirectD10100000  (0.059) (0.034) (0.026) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.008) 
-0.022 -0.061 -0.043 0.039 0.069 -0.013 -0.008 indirectD10010100  (0.118) (0.068) (0.053) (0.033) (0.029) (0.025) (0.015) 
0.087 -0.043 -0.049 -0.015 0.008 0.015 0.037 indirectD10010010  (0.120) (0.069) (0.053) (0.033) (0.029) (0.024) (0.015) 
0.104 -0.064 -0.046 0.006 -0.011 0.021 0.017 indirectD10010000  (0.089) (0.051) (0.039) (0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.011) 
0.057 -0.061 -0.107 -0.045 0.009 -0.007 0.004 indirectD10001001  (0.069) (0.040) (0.031) (0.019) (0.017) (0.014) (0.009) 
-0.024 0.028 -0.074 -0.013 0.014 0.016 0.025 indirectD10000101  (0.076) (0.043) (0.033) (0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.010) 
-0.031 -0.013 0.047 -0.042 -0.018 0.036 0.026 indirectD10000100  (0.118) (0.068) (0.052) (0.032) (0.028) (0.024) (0.015) 
0.179 -0.189 -0.121 -0.043 -0.034 -0.004 -0.010 indirectD10000011  (0.120) (0.069) (0.054) (0.033) (0.029) (0.025) (0.016) 
0.096 -0.073 -0.129 -0.046 -0.007 -0.010 -0.002 indirectD10000001  (0.047) (0.027) (0.021) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) 
0.109 -0.027 -0.054 -0.010 -0.011 -0.014 0.015 indirectD10000000  (0.053) (0.030) (0.024) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.007) 
0.109 0.003 -0.056 -0.023 -0.014 -0.007 -0.005 indirectD01100001  (0.118) (0.068) (0.052) (0.033) (0.029) (0.024) (0.015) 
-0.158 0.062 0.008 0.042 0.004 0.040 0.021 indirectD01011000  (0.118) (0.068) (0.052) (0.032) (0.028) (0.024) (0.015) 
-0.123 -0.012 0.015 0.057 0.070 0.009 0.025 indirectD01010001  (0.125) (0.082) (0.056) (0.035) (0.031) (0.026) (0.016) 
-0.116 0.071 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.036 indirectD01010000  (0.086) (0.049) (0.038) (0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.011) 
0.065 0.034 -0.058 0.008 -0.002 0.002 0.008 indirectD01000010  (0.086) (0.050) (0.038) (0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.011) 
-0.013 0.037 -0.055 0.012 0.010 0.011 -0.001 indirectD01000001  (0.074) (0.044) (0.033) (0.021) (0.018) (0.015) (0.010) 
-0.330 0.093 -0.052 0.119 -0.024 -0.006 -0.028 indirectD00110001  (0.118) (0.068) (0.053) (0.033) (0.036) (0.024) (0.015) 
-0.178 0.062 0.017 -0.032 -0.054 -0.005 -0.008 indirectD00100000  (0.118) (0.068) (0.052) (0.033) (0.028) (0.024) (0.016) 
-0.131 0.067 -0.031 0.027 0.086 -0.032 0.001 indirectD00011000  (0.118) (0.067) (0.052) (0.032) (0.028) (0.024) (0.015) 
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Table B9. Continued. 
With Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 5 Airline 6 Airline 7 
-0.031 0.052 -0.074 0.014 0.018 0.022 -0.002 indirectD00010001  (0.072) (0.042) (0.033) (0.021) (0.018) (0.015) (0.010) 
-0.067 0.059 -0.029 0.062 0.016 0.027 0.012 indirectD00010000  (0.074) (0.042) (0.033) (0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.010) 
-0.001 0.010 -0.030 -0.004 0.001 0.003 0.035 indirectD00001001  (0.118) (0.068) (0.052) (0.032) (0.028) (0.024) (0.016) 
-0.156 -0.016 -0.141 0.028 0.028 -0.006 0.000 indirectD00001000  (0.118) (0.068) (0.053) (0.033) (0.029) (0.025) (0.015) 
-0.253 -0.008 -0.093 -0.007 0.020 0.035 0.008 indirectD00000100  (0.118) (0.068) (0.053) (0.033) (0.029) (0.025) (0.016) 
0.048 0.004 -0.023 -0.037 0.038 0.054 -0.003 indirectD00000010  (0.086) (0.049) (0.038) (0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.011) 
-0.110 0.047 -0.086 -0.015 0.003 0.000 -0.003 indirectD00000001  (0.047) (0.027) (0.021) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) 
0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.057 firm
AAD  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) 
-0.067 0.146      firm
ASD  (0.096) (0.058)      
0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 firm
COD  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 firm
DLD  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 firm
HPD  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 firm
NWD  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
     0.052  firm
KND  
     (0.021)  
  0.100     firm
QQD  
  (0.040)     
   0.055  0.055 0.055 firm
RUD  
   (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010) 
0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 firm
TWD  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 firm
UAD  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 firm
USD  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
    0.064   firm
YXD  
    (0.024)   
 0.000      firm
JD 7  
 (0.000)      
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Table B9. Continued. 
With Virtual Fare 
iS  
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 Airline 5 Airline 6 Airline 7 
     0.064  firm
EVD  
     (0.018)  
 0.039      firm
FLD  
 (0.040)      
Obs 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 
R-square 0.5634 0.3928 0.4978 0.543 0.5233 0.5221 0.4725 
† Standard errors are in parentheses. 
- Quality dummy indirectD10101101  is omitted due to perfect collinearity. 
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APPENDIX C 
CROSS-PRICE ELASTICITY VECTORS 
 
Appendix C1. Cross-Price Elasticity Vectors without Southwest’s Virtual Fare 
: Data one quarter after Southwest’s entry are used in the estimation of demand 
 
1) Two carriers are competing one quarter after Southwest’s entry 
With Respect to 
the Price of 
 
1 SW 
1 -1.237 0.429 Price Elasticity 
of Demand for SW 0.592 -2.075 
 
2) Three carriers are competing one quarter after Southwest’s entry 
With Respect to the Price 
of 
 
1 2 SW 
1 -1.290 0.389 0.173 
2 0.118 -1.220 -0.041 Price Elasticity of Demand for 
SW 0.329 0.169 -1.483 
 
3) Four carriers are competing one quarter after Southwest’s entry 
With Respect to the Price of 
 1 2 3 SW 
1 -0.799 -0.516 -0.402 0.137 
2 -0.251 -0.989 0.707 0.326 
3 -0.118 0.276 -1.156 0.097 
Price Elasticity 
of Demand for 
SW 0.047 0.412 0.373 -1.638 
 
4) Five carriers are competing one quarter after Southwest’s entry 
With Respect to the Price of 
 1 2 3 4 SW 
1 -1.138 0.033 0.244 -0.162 0.148 
2 -0.042 -1.205 0.222 0.008 0.148 
3 0.024 0.122 -1.025 0.324 -0.206 
4 -0.030 0.000 0.124 -0.698 -0.064 
Price Elasticity 
of Demand for 
SW 0.166 0.322 -0.235 -0.169 -1.455 
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5) Six carriers are competing one quarter after Southwest’s entry 
With Respect to the Price of 
 1 2 3 4 5 SW 
1 -0.713 -0.642 0.214 -0.629 -0.387 0.185 
2 -0.322 -0.473 0.146 0.514 -0.737 0.087 
3 0.047 0.103 -1.112 -0.167 -0.294 -0.030 
4 -0.140 0.151 -0.130 -0.811 0.478 0.109 
5 -0.041 -0.142 -0.095 0.277 -0.716 0.174 
Price Elasticity 
of Demand for 
SW 0.021 0.057 -0.070 0.308 0.732 -1.379 
 
6) Seven carriers are competing one quarter after Southwest’s entry 
With Respect to the Price of 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 SW 
1 -0.830 -0.192 -0.088 -0.287 -0.356 -1.368 0.344 
2 -0.100 -0.903 0.237 0.226 -0.056 -0.428 -0.062 
3 -0.037 0.141 -1.224 0.006 0.250 0.633 -0.093 
4 -0.106 0.031 -0.045 -0.521 0.048 0.533 -0.062 
5 -0.054 -0.026 0.080 0.049 -0.588 0.029 -0.035 
6 -0.119 -0.084 0.123 0.203 0.003 0.069 0.028 
Price Elasticity 
of Demand for 
SW 0.113 -0.070 -0.133 -0.041 -0.095 0.271 -1.098 
 
7) Eight carriers are competing one quarter after Southwest’s entry 
With Respect to the Price of 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 SW 
1 -0.762 -0.736 0.121 -0.317 -0.555 -0.710 -0.342 0.793 
2 -0.286 -0.075 -0.003 -0.502 0.390 -0.804 0.354 0.070 
3 0.000 -0.029 -0.461 -0.240 0.047 0.200 -0.347 -0.399 
4 -0.044 -0.199 -0.110 -0.446 0.175 0.448 0.400 -0.086 
5 -0.093 0.127 0.022 0.130 -0.736 -0.001 -0.151 -0.030 
6 -0.064 -0.193 0.077 0.260 0.012 -0.221 0.708 -0.137 
7 -0.028 0.044 -0.071 0.130 -0.063 0.417 -1.344 0.001 
Price Elasticity 
of Demand for 
SW 0.182 0.027 -0.382 -0.187 -0.053 -0.433 0.022 -1.041 
 
 
  
101 
Appendix C2. Cross-Price Elasticity Vectors with Southwest’s Virtual Fare 
: Data one quarter after and before Southwest’s entry are used in the estimation 
 
1) Two carriers are competing one quarter after Southwest’s entry 
With Respect to 
the Price of 
 
1 SW 
1 -1.155 0.555 Price Elasticity 
of Demand for SW 0.448 -2.603 
 
2) Three carriers are competing one quarter after Southwest’s entry 
With Respect to the Price 
of 
 
1 2 SW 
1 -1.299 0.435 0.316 
2 0.134 -1.207 -0.132 Price Elasticity of Demand for 
SW 0.305 0.030 -1.706 
 
3) Four carriers are competing one quarter after Southwest’s entry 
With Respect to the Price of 
 1 2 3 SW 
1 -0.980 -0.246 -0.534 0.600 
2 -0.145 -1.157 0.853 0.256 
3 -0.124 0.318 -0.983 -0.030 
Price Elasticity 
of Demand for 
SW 0.163 0.202 0.010 -1.887 
 
4) Five carriers are competing one quarter after Southwest’s entry 
With Respect to the Price of 
 1 2 3 4 SW 
1 -1.107 0.117 0.099 0.013 0.105 
2 -0.010 -1.048 0.205 -0.011 -0.059 
3 -0.009 0.116 -1.153 0.104 -0.050 
4 -0.014 -0.004 0.041 -0.905 -0.012 
Price Elasticity 
of Demand for 
SW 0.123 0.092 0.070 0.102 -1.631 
 
5) Six carriers are competing one quarter after Southwest’s entry 
With Respect to the Price of 
 1 2 3 4 5 SW 
1 -0.894 -0.403 0.102 -0.316 -0.228 0.474 
2 -0.221 -0.765 0.067 0.518 -0.234 0.200 
3 0.010 0.052 -1.047 -0.155 -0.297 0.112 
4 -0.080 0.155 -0.110 -0.864 0.338 -0.018 
5 -0.019 -0.034 -0.082 0.193 -0.688 0.017 
Price Elasticity 
of Demand for 
SW 0.071 0.092 0.075 -0.009 0.020 -1.598 
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6) Seven carriers are competing one quarter after Southwest’s entry 
With Respect to the Price of 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 SW 
1 -0.850 -0.224 -0.020 -0.136 -0.010 -0.863 0.185 
2 -0.135 -0.945 0.228 0.151 0.182 -0.329 0.062 
3 -0.035 0.129 -1.176 -0.054 -0.006 0.439 0.030 
4 -0.055 0.038 -0.045 -0.748 -0.014 0.014 0.021 
5 -0.031 0.018 -0.022 -0.020 -0.857 0.234 0.006 
6 -0.075 -0.060 0.083 -0.004 0.137 -0.006 0.002 
Price Elasticity 
of Demand for 
SW 0.011 0.012 0.014 0.033 0.046 0.043 -1.143 
 
7) Eight carriers are competing one quarter after Southwest’s entry 
With Respect to the Price of 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 SW 
1 -0.865 -0.304 0.142 -0.215 -0.324 -0.090 0.053 0.146 
2 -0.117 -0.557 -0.162 -0.034 0.131 -0.152 -0.251 0.044 
3 0.002 -0.149 -0.672 -0.193 0.081 -0.200 -0.028 0.038 
4 -0.053 -0.031 -0.113 -0.675 0.181 0.198 -0.001 0.024 
5 -0.057 0.028 0.038 0.137 -0.880 -0.088 0.132 0.004 
6 -0.015 -0.040 -0.057 0.100 -0.053 -0.688 0.213 0.004 
7 -0.006 -0.039 -0.007 -0.004 0.045 0.115 -0.808 0.000 
Price Elasticity 
of Demand for 
SW 0.003 -0.001 0.022 0.019 0.006 0.003 0.009 -1.088 
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